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1. INTRODUCTION
The law of unjustified enrichment in both Scotland and South Africa is
essentially civilian in origin. In both jurisdictions, transfers made under a
mistake as to the transferor’s liability are recoverable by means of the
condictio indebiti. Both Scottish and South African law generally require
positive proof of a liability mistake on the part of the transferor in order to
found the restitution of mistaken transfers. Moreover, in both Scottish and
South African law the excusability of the transferor’s mistake is regarded as a
relevant consideration in determining whether or not restitution should be
permitted. Given the common origin of the law of unjust enrichment in
these jurisdictions, the presence of a requirement of excusable mistake in
both is perhaps unsurprising. Indeed, in both Scottish and South African law
the requirement of excusable mistake in the context of the condictio indebiti
does appear to derive — at least in part — from the general analysis of
mistake of fact found in the Roman sources.
Yet the similarity between Scottish and South African law in this respect
turns out to be a superficial one only. In fact, the requirement of excusable
mistake has evolved very differently in each of these two jurisdictions.
Scottish law demonstrates the relatively orderly and linear development of
the condictio indebiti from its Roman origins. Having been introduced into
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Scottish law by Lord Brougham in 1830, the excusability requirement has
been in decline since the second half of the nineteenth century. Certainly, in
the decision of the Court of Session in Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of
New York v Lothian Regional Council1 in 1994 it was interpreted in such a way
as to ameliorate its impact considerably. In South African law, on the other
hand, the story of the excusability requirement contains some unexpected
elements. In particular, the influence of the remedy of restitutio in integrum
on the condictio indebiti has been a decisive factor. Having originated in the
late nineteenth century, the requirement continues in full force today.
Restitution by means of the condictio indebiti is frequently refused on this
basis, as the decision of the Appellate Division in Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty)
Ltd v Receiver of Revenue in 1992 shows.2
Should the excusability requirement continue in force in modern South
African law? Answering this question requires a more nuanced understand-
ing of the nature of the requirement. In fact, it seems that there at least three
different ways in which the concept of excusable mistake can be understood.
Both Scotland and South Africa are characterized by a mixture of these ideas,
but in each case one version of the requirement has come to dominate. If it is
to have any claim to rationality, each version of the excusability requirement
must be capable of being reconciled with the principled basis of the condictio
indebiti. Moreover, even if such reconciliation is possible, the case for
adopting or retaining a particular version of the requirement must be
supported by positive considerations of policy or equity.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE REQUIREMENT OF
EXCUSABLE MISTAKE IN THE CIVILIAN TRADITION
From an early stage in its development Roman law appears to have
recognized a fundamental distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes
of fact.3 The late classical jurist Paul stated unequivocally that ‘mistake of law
prejudices, mistake of fact does not’.4 While a mistake of law would in no
circumstances avail one who sought to rely on it, mistake of fact could be
freely raised as a cause of action or defence. However, Paul himself qualified
this statement by saying that specific classes of people — women, minors and
soldiers — were exempt from the operation of the mistake of law rule.5
Labeo, writing two centuries before, seems to have gone further than Paul,
stating as a general proposition that only those who had access to legal advice
1 1995 SC 151 at 165–7 (Lord Hope), 173 (Lord Clyde) and 175 (Lord Cullen).
2 1992 (4) SA 202 (A) 223–5, 226–7. Another recent example of a claim refused
on this basis in South African law is Firstrand Bank Ltd (Formerly First National Bank of
SA Ltd) v Absa Bank Ltd 2001 (1) SA803 (W) at 815.
3 Laurens C Winkel Error Iuris Nocet: Rechtsdwaling als Rechtsorde-Probleem (doc-
toral thesis, University of Amsterdam, 1982) 189–202; idem ‘Mistake of law: English
and Roman comparisons’ in W Swadling (ed) The Limits of Restitutionary Claims: A
Comparative Analysis (1997) 244 at 246.
4 D 22.6.9 pr (Paul Mistake of Law and Fact) [Watson’s translation].
5 D 22.6.9 pr -1 (Paul Mistake of Law and Fact).
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or who were themselves legally competent should be prevented from relying
on mistake of law.6 In other words, Labeo appears to have argued that only
where the mistake of law could reasonably have been avoided should the
rule operate.7 Thus Labeo rationalized the mistake of law rule in terms of the
more fundamental idea that one cannot rely on a careless mistake: since
everyone can reasonably be expected to know what the law is, mistakes of
law are typically careless.8 On the other hand, Labeo’s analysis appears to
have had implications for later jurists’ understanding of mistake of fact too.
Just as a mistake of law might not prejudice where, exceptionally, it could not
have been avoided even through the exercise of reasonable care, according to
Paul mistake of fact would prejudice if it was the product of carelessness or gross
negligence (summa neglegentia).9 Similarly, according to Ulpian,
‘[t]here is no excuse for supine ignorance of fact, but scrupulous inquiry is not
required. The sort of knowledge looked for is that which does not excuse gross
negligence or laxity, but does not demand the curiosity of an informer.’10
It must be emphasized that this general analysis of mistakes of law and fact
does not seem to have been applied to what later came to be called the
condictio indebiti, at least during the classical period.11 For example, in his
account of this application of the condictio Ulpian simply asserted the
requirement of mistake or ignorance without qualifying it.12 Admittedly, the
condictio may have been barred by mistake of law in particular cases: the
Emperors Severus and Antoninus issued a rescript to the effect that where an
heir had paid out a legacy or fideicommissum by mistake, not realizing that
he could subtract the quarta Pegasiana, he could not recover the money so
paid.13 But it does not seem that the mistake of law rule was generally applied
to the condictio at this time. However, later the position appears to have
changed. Towards the end of the third century AD the Emperors Diocletian
and Maximian issued a rescript which appeared to prohibit generally
6 D 22.6.9 3 (Paul Mistake of Law and Fact, quoting Labeo).
7 It seems that Labeo may have been usingAristotle’s analysis of mistake to explain
the indigenous Roman rule that ‘mistake of law does not profit’.According toAristo-
tle, an act which is performed in ignorance ought not to be punished, since ignorance
excuses, but where the actor’s ignorance was careless, in the sense that it was in his
power to avoid it, then the actor will nevertheless be held responsible for his act:
Nicomachean Ethics 1110b18–1111a2; 1113b22–1114a3. See further Winkel ‘Mistake
of law’op cit note 3 at 244–5, 247.
8 D 22.6.2 (Neratius Parchments).
9 D 22.6.9.2 (Paul Mistake of Law and Fact).
10 D 22.6.6 (Ulpian Book 18 Lex Julia and Papia) [Watson’s translation].
11 See Winkel Error iuris nocet op cit note 3 at 189–202; Daniel Visser Die Rol van
Dwaling by die Condictio Indebiti: ’n Regshistoriese Perspektief met ’n Regsvergelykende
Ekskursus (doctoral thesis, University of Leyden, 1985) 31–45.
12 D 12.6.1 (Ulpian Book 26 On the Edict). Similarly, in a rescript of Diocletian and
Maximian preserved in the Code, recovery by means of the condictio is permitted
where the mistake in question is clearly one of law: see C 4.5.5. See also Gaius
Institutes III. 91.
13 D 22.6.9.5 (Paul Mistake of Law and Fact).
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restitution on grounds of mistake of law: ‘when someone has paid money
which is not owed in ignorance of the law, then there is no recovery’.14 It may
be that this rescript has been taken out of context, and was not formulated as a
general prohibition after all.15 Nevertheless, to later readers of the Corpus Iuris
Civilis, the ancient law on this point seemed horribly confused.
Different ages adopted different approaches in their attempts to reconcile
the apparent conflicts in the ancient sources. During the medieval period the
weight of authority appears to have been in favour of the recovery of
payments made under mistake of law. Following the Glossators, it was
argued that recovery would be refused only where the claimant had
honoured a natural obligation in the belief that he was legally bound to do
so.16 On the other hand, in the early modern period the pendulum seemed
to swing: the French Humanists insisted on the application to the condictio
indebiti of the mistake of law rule.17 This meant that the requirement of
non-negligent mistake of fact came to be applied here also, since it figured in
the general analysis of mistakes of law and fact in D 22.6. In his Commentary
on the Pandects, first published around the turn of the eighteenth century, the
Roman-Dutch jurist Johannes Voet adopted a broadly Humanist position:
not only did he apply the mistake of law rule to the condictio indebiti; he
also stated that in order to found this action a mistake of fact must be nec
supina nec affectata (neither negligent nor studied).18 On the other hand, as
Professor Visser has shown, although there appears to have been no
unanimity among the Roman-Dutch Institutional writers regarding the
mistake of law rule,19 Voet appears to have been alone in embracing the
requirement of excusable mistake of fact.20 As for the Scottish Institutional
writers, they do not appear ever to have adopted the mistake of law rule in
the context of the condictio indebiti.21 It follows that they also did not apply
the other half of the analysis in D 22.6 to the condictio indebiti, namely the
requirement of excusable mistake of fact.22
Ultimately the jurists of the nineteenth century German Historical School
were able to reconcile the conflicts in the Roman sources by explicitly
applying to the condictio indebiti the concept of avoidable mistake already
14 C 1.18.10; also — by implication — C 4.5.6 (Diocl et Max).
15 For an account of the debate see Visser op cit note 11 at 45–52; Winkel Error iuris
nocet op cit note 3 at 189–202.
16 Visser op cit note 11 ch 2.
17 Ibid ch 3.
18 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 12.6n7.
19 Visser op cit note 11 at 152–77, especially 175–7.
20 Ibid at 177–82; idem ‘Error of law and mistaken payments: A milestone’ (1992)
109 SALJ 177 at 183–4. See also the acceptance of this view in W de Vos Verryking-
saanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 3 ed (1987) 69–70.
21 Robin Evans-Jones Unjustified Enrichment: Enrichment by Deliberate Conferral vol
1 (2003) 77n9.
22 Ibid at 87.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL830
latent in D 22.6.23 Savigny, for example, thought that although any mistake
would in principle found the condictio indebiti, this assistance ought to be
excluded where the mistake had been inexcusable (verschuldeten): the right
to recover on grounds of mistake was founded on the principles of equity
(Begünstigung aus Billigkeit), and it would be inequitable to permit
restitution under these circumstances.24 A few years later Vangerow
formulated the principle even more broadly: ‘only excusable error, but then
every excusable error, without distinction as to whether it is an error of law
or an error of fact’.25 This implied a general requirement of excusability
applicable to every sort of mistake, wholly supplanting the mistake of law
rule. However, most Pandectists followed Savigny in characterizing mistakes
of law as typically avoidable and therefore typically inexcusable.26 Similarly,
regarding mistakes of fact, most took the view these were typically excusable
(entschuldbar).27 For example, according to Mackeldey’s Lehrbuch, first
published in 1814, error of fact would found recovery unless it arose from
gross negligence and carelessness.28 This negative formulation — which
once again closely tracked the analysis in D 22.629 — suggested that the
claimant under the condictio could make out a prima facie claim merely by
pointing to his mistake: only exceptionally would this prima facie claim be
23 Augustin Leyser, writing around the middle of the eighteenth century, had
already proposed subordinating the intractable law/fact distinction to a more funda-
mental principle of error invincibilis, unavoidable mistake: Meditationes Vol VI Spec
289, 1–2. See Reinhard Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of
the Civilian Tradition (1990) 869–71. On the German Historical School and the Pan-
dectists generally, see Visser op cit note 11 ch 5.
24 Friedrich Carl von Savigny System des Heutigen Römischen Rechts vol III ‘Irrthum
und Unwissenheit’ (1840) 448 para XXXV.
25 Karl Adolph von Vangerow Lehrbuch der Pandekten vol III 7 ed (1876) 397–8.
The translation is Daniel Visser’s: see ‘Unjustified enrichment’ in Reinhard Zimmer-
mann & Daniel Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa
(1996) 523 at 529. Compare also the work of Otto Bähr, who argued that no mistake,
even a mistake of fact, would found the condictio indebiti unless the circumstances
were such that, given human nature, a mistake might easily have occurred. For Bähr,
error probabilis — terminology already used by Johannes Voet at the beginning of the
eighteenth century — had both substantive and procedural significance: the mistake
must be one which could in theory have befallen even a careful person and was
therefore likely to have occurred in this case. See Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas
22.6n6 and 7; Otto Bähr Die Anerkennung Als Verpflichtungsgrund 3 ed (1894) 55–6
para 19.
26 For example, Savigny op cit note 24 at 448; Anton Thibaut System des Pandek-
tenrechts (1814) para 29; Ferdinand Mackeldey Handbook of the Roman Law translated
and edited by Moses Dropsie (1883) para 178; Bernard Windscheid Lehrbuch des
Pandektenrechts (1906) para 79a.
27 This seemed to fit in with Paul’s statement in D 22.6.9pr and 2, that mistake of
law did not prejudice, provided that it did not arise from gross negligence (summa
neglegentia).
28 Mackeldey op cit note 26 para 178. Also eg W Moddermann Handboek voor het
Romeinsche Recht 5 ed (1913) para 79; Windscheid op cit note 26 para 79a.
29 D 22.6.9.2 (Paul Mistake of Fact and Law).
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barred by the fact that the mistake had been grossly negligent. Thus the
Pandectists were able to harmonize the ancient texts by means of a general
criterion of excusability, while in practice maintaining the distinction
between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact.
3. THE REQUIREMENT OF EXCUSABLE MISTAKE IN
SCOTTISH LAW
3.1 Wilson and McLellan v Sinclair and Dixons v Monkland Canal Co:
The influence of Lord Brougham
The requirement of excusable mistake was applied to the condictio indebiti
for the first time in Scottish law in Wilson and McLellan v Sinclair, decided on
appeal by the House of Lords in 1830.30 No Scottish court had previously
acknowledged any requirement of excusable mistake of fact in respect of the
condictio indebiti.31 Nor was this requirement established in English law at
that time,32 although the mistake of law rule had already become entrenched
through the decision of the House of Lords in Brisbane v Dacres.33 On the
other hand, the writings of the German Historical School dominated civilian
legal scholarship and indeed legal scholarship generally during the nineteenth
century.34 Thus it was the scholarship of the Historical School which formed
the wider backdrop to the decision in Wilson and McLellan v Sinclair,35 all the
more so because Lord Brougham, who delivered the leading speech, was
30 (1830) 4 W & S 398 at 409.
31 It had been argued as a defence in Duke of Argyle v Lord Halcraig’s Representatives
(1723) Mor 2929 and Carrick v Carse (1778) Hailes 783: see Scottish Law Commission
Discussion Paper No 95 ‘Recovery of benefits conferred under error of law’ vol 2 at
55–56n6.
32 The requirement of excusable mistake is not mentioned, for example, in Bilbie v
Lumley (1802) 2 East 469 or Brisbane v Dacres (1813) 5 Taunt 143. See, however,
Milnes v Duncan (1827) 6 B&C 671 at 677, where it was held that negligent mistake of
fact on the part of the plaintiff — that is, negligence in not availing himself of the
means of knowledge within his power — would defeat his claim to recover. Such a
defence was however clearly rejected in Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M&W 54. See gener-
ally Peter Birks ‘The recovery of carelessly mistaken payments’ (1972) 25 Current
Legal Problems 179 at 180–1 and 197.
33 Brisbane v Dacres supra note 32.
34 Their influence was particularly strongly felt in Scotland, as an uncodified civil
law system. See eg John W Cairns ‘The influence of the German Historical School in
early nineteenth century Edinburgh’ (1994) 20 Syracuse Journal of International Law and
Commerce 191; Alan Rodger ‘Scottish advocates in the nineteenth century: The Ger-
man connection’ (1994) 110 LQR 563. From the last decade of the eighteenth cen-
tury it became relatively common for Scottish advocates to spend time at one or other
of the German universities, in order to familiarize themselves with the scholarship
flourishing there. The Advocates Library at the Faculty of Advocates in Edinburgh
began to acquire works by members of the Historical School. For example, in 1818
the library acquired a copy of Thibaut’s System des Pandektenrechts. See Rodger at 580.
35 (1830) 4 W & S 398 at 409.
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himself a Scot educated in Edinburgh and admitted to the Faculty of
Advocates in 1800.36
In fact, we can be sure that Lord Brougham was aware of the controversy
surrounding the mistake of law rule in Roman law and its application to the
condictio indebiti in particular because he referred to it in the speech he gave
in Dixons v Monkland Canal Company in 1831:
‘No doubt there was a great difference of opinion among the Roman lawyers,
as to the limits of the proposition, how far ignorantia juris, or ignorantia facti
might be held to give a title to the protection of a condictio indebiti, and as to
how far the doctrine relating to indebiti solutio was confined to cases where the
fact was unknown or mistaken, or extended also to cases where the law was
unknown or mistaken.’37
As for mistake of fact, in the Wilson case Lord Brougham set out the
position as follows:
‘If the party who has paid the money is under an unavoidable mistake, if the
mistake is no fault of his, then he may have it back again; but, if he has himself
to blame — if he himself paid the money, ignorant of the fact, and had the
means of knowledge of the fact within his power — and did not use those
means, he shall in vain attempt, by means of proceedings at law, to have that
repaid to him. That has been decided in our Courts repeatedly. It is a rule
founded on the strict principles of ordinary and universal justice, which will
never allow a man to take advantage of his own wrong, — or, what is the same
thing, of his own gross negligence. The ground of action being ignorance, it
must be avoidable ignorance, — it must not be ignorance through his own
fault, or having shut out the light by wilfully closing his eyes.’38
Lord Brougham’s claim that a man may not take advantage of his own
gross negligence strongly recalls the statement of Paul in D 22.6, that mistake
of fact prejudices (nocet) if it is the product of carelessness or gross negligence
(summa neglegentia).39 On the other hand, Lord Brougham appears to have
gone beyond the civilian sources in his formulation of this rule: rather than
viewing gross negligence as an occasional bar to recovery for mistakes of fact,
he required the pursuer actively to demonstrate an unavoidable and
therefore blameless mistake. He would have refused recovery on this basis:
the pursuer had had the papers on the face of which the mistake appeared in
his possession for a year, and could during that time have inspected them and
discovered the mistake.40 In fact, Lord Brougham seemed to regard
substantive excusability and probability as two sides of the same coin.41 In the
Dixons case he went further still:
36 Michael Lobban ‘Brougham, Henry Peter, First Baron Brougham and Vaux
(1778–1868)’Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004).
37 Dixons v Monkland Canal Company 5 W & S (1831) 445 at 448.
38 Wilson & McLellan v Sinclair supra note 35 at 409.
39 D 22.6.9.2 (Paul De iuris et facti ignorantia).
40 Wilson & McLellan v Sinclair supra note 35 at 409.
41 Ibid. Cf the work of Otto Bähr op cit note 25.
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‘I do not think that it is necessary, in order to dispose of this case, to raise the
general question, Whether a party can recover money paid under a mistake of
law, or without due knowledge of all the facts, and . . . when there is nothing
against good conscience in retaining the money — that is to say, where the payor
has not been induced to pay by any ignorance impressed upon him, as it were, by
the person procuring it to be paid, or any other fraudulent interposition, which
would make it contrary to a good conscience for him to retain it.’42
Thus he questioned obiter whether a mistaken payment could ever be
recoverable by means of the condictio indebiti in the absence of some
unconscionable behaviour on the part of the recipient, specifically, the
inducement of the payer’s mistake. Here the Lord Chancellor appears to
have been drawing on the general principles governing relief on grounds of
mistake in the English Courts of Equity. He appears to have regarded the
condictio indebiti as a species of equitable relief against mistake.43 It follows
that although the defence of summa neglegentia inherent in the Roman
sources was the ultimate source of the requirement of excusable mistake of
fact in Scots law, Lord Brougham’s version of the requirement transcended
those sources. The powerful dicta in Wilson and McLellan v Sinclair and Dixons
v Monkland Canal Company established a positive requirement of excusable
mistake of fact, to be demonstrated by the pursuer in every case. Moreover,
his emphasis in Dixons v Monkland Canal Company on the need for some
unconscionable behaviour on the part of the recipient had the potential to
restrict restitution still further.
This version of the requirement of excusable mistake has been reiterated
subsequently in several cases. In Youle v Cochrane44 in 1868, the pursuer, the
consignee of certain cargo, had paid the shipmaster the full freight, in
ignorance of the fact that the shipper had already paid a third of that amount
to the charterer. Lord Ardmillan held that ‘an error in fact arising from mere
ignorance is not enough to sustain a plea of condictio indebiti — the
ignorance must be excusable’.45 Moreover, excusability was to be deter-
mined by asking whether the pursuer ‘had within his reach the means of
knowing that of which he was ignorant’.46 Since there was a receipt for the
amount already paid written in the margin of the bill of lading, there could
be very little doubt that the pursuer had failed to demonstrate excusable
ignorance according to this test. Lord Ardmillan would have refused the
pursuer’s claim for this reason; in fact, the case was decided on a different
basis. A still more restrictive approach was adopted by Lord President Inglis
in Balfour v Smith and Logan in 1877, a case which concerned an overpayment
42 Supra note 37 at 447.
43 This analogy is unsurprising, since Brougham himself appears to have been
strongly in favour of the anglicization of Scots law: Cairns op cit note 34 at 199–201.
44 (1868) SC 3rd series VI 427.
45 Youle v Cochrane supra note 44 at 433. Cf Evans-Jones op cit note 21 at 90.
46 Ibid.
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of the amount due in respect of a joining contact.47 He held that the pursuer
could recover only if he could show some extrinsic cause for the mistake,
aside from his own fault, in the form of ‘adverse circumstances’ or the
conduct of the other party.48 However, under the circumstances this test
appeared to be satisfied: the pursuer alleged that the incorrect statements of
the defender had induced the mistake, and indeed it even appeared that the
defender had known these statements to be false.
As for the twentieth century, a positive requirement of excusable mistake
appears to have been approved in principle by the Court of Session in two
decisions, Glasgow Corporation v Lord Advocate49 and Taylor v Wilson’s
Trustees.50 However, both cases concerned mistakes of law, and both were
decided on that basis. Indeed, in the Glasgow Corporation case the question of
excusability was considered almost exclusively as a justification for the rule
excluding recovery for mistakes of law.51 On the other hand, a restrictive
version of the requirement was applied to a mistake of fact by the Sheriff
Court in Peter Walker and Sons (Edinburgh) Ltd v Leith Glazing Company Ltd in
1980.52 However, as in the Balfour case, which was cited, recovery was
permitted. The case concerned a claim to recover part of an amount paid
under a contract for the repair of windows; when the defenders submitted
their account, the pursuers’ employee paid in full, wrongly believing the
additional work to have been validly authorized. It was held that if proper
inquiries had been made, the mistake would have been discovered; thus in a
sense the mistake had been induced by the pursuers’ own carelessness.
However, the account submitted by the defenders was held to be misleading,
and on this basis the pursuers’ mistake of fact was characterized as excusable,
despite their carelessness.53
47 (1877) SC 4th series IV 454. Cf Evans-Jones op cit note 21 at 91.
48 ‘[A] party, having made a payment in error, must, before he can recover, show
that the error was not induced by his own fault, but was due to adverse circumstances,
or to the proceedings of the other party.’ Balfour v Smith and Logan supra note 47 at
458–9.
49 1959 SC 203 at 233.
50 1975 SC 146 at 156.
51 See the speech of Lord President Clyde in Glasgow Corporation v Lord Advocate
supra note 49 at 232–3, as well as Lord Sorn at 243.
52 1980 SLT (Sh Ct) 104.
53 ‘It is . . . not a complete bar to the recovery of money paid by mistake that the
party who has paid it may have had the means of discovering the true facts, and it is
also relevant to consider whether the actings of the other party have contributed to
the mistake.’ Balfour v Smith and Logan supra note 47 was cited in support of this
proposition: Peter Walker supra note 52 at 105.
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3.2 The emergence of a less restrictive version of the requirement
Far more frequently the issue of excusability has been ignored, actively
repudiated, or recast as an equitable defence.54 In the early case of Bell v
Thomson,55 rates had been levied by the Police Commissioners of a town in
respect of certain premises which the pursuer had erroneously represented to
be within it; three years later the pursuer claimed repetition of the amounts
paid from their representative. The Lord Justice-Clerk would have been
prepared in principle to recognize a defence of negligent mistake, but he saw
inexcusable mistake as merely one factor in determining the equities of the
case: given that the current ratepayers were not the same as those who had
originally received the rates from the pursuer, it would not have been
equitable to restore the sums paid.56 The Lord Justice-Clerk would have
been prepared to allow the negligence of the pursuer to be outweighed by a
similarly negligent mistake on the part of the defender, but as it turned out,
the Commissioners had clearly not been negligent in acting on the
information supplied by the pursuer, that is, in levying the rates.57 In fact, it
seems that in no case since Youle v Cochrane in 1868 has any member of a
Scottish court been prepared to refuse the condictio indebiti on grounds of
inexcusable mistake of fact.58 The watershed in this respect appears to have
come as early as Balfour v Smith and Logan.59 As we have seen, in that case
Lord President Inglis recognized proof of excusable mistake of fact as a
requirement for success in the condictio indebiti. However, in the same case
Lord Shand referred to the decision of Williams J in the English case of
Townsend v Crowdy,60 in which it was held that ‘it is not enough that the party
had the means of learning the truth if he had chosen to make inquiry. The
only limitation now is, that he must not waive all inquiry.’61 He concluded
that, contrary to the view of the Lord President, ‘the fact that the defender’s
representations had induced the error is not essential to the pursuer’s
54 Examples of cases in which the excusability requirement was simply ignored are
The Countess of Cromertie and Mackenzie v The Lord Advocate (1871) SC 3rd series IX
988 and Wallet v Ramsay (1904) 12 SLT 111.
55 (1867) SC 3rd series VI 64.
56 Bell v Thomson supra note 55 at 66–7.
57 Ibid at 67. Cf Evans-Jones op cit note 21 at 91.
58 Cf Evans-Jones note 21 at 88: ‘[A]lthough in the past the rule that the error must
be excusable was often expressed in relation to errors of fact, it was very rarely
applied.’
59 Supra note 47.
60 (1860) 8 CB Rep NS 477.
61 Townsend v Crowdy supra note 60 at 494 per Williams J. Williams J in turn cited
the speech of Baron Parke in Kelly v Solari, a decision of the English Court of Exche-
quer concerning the action for money had and received, according to which money
may generally be recovered back but if it is paid under the impression of the truth of a
fact which is untrue, it may, generally speaking, be recovered back ‘however careless
the party paying may have been, in omitting to use due diligence to inquire into the
fact’. Kelly v Solari (1841) 9 M&S 54 at 59.
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success’.62 Thus the very idea of a substantive excusability requirement —
whether positively or negatively formulated — was repudiated.
In a series of decisions during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
the Scottish courts have granted the condictio indebiti in circumstances
which would have been insufficient to found recovery according to the
restrictive version of the excusability test adopted by the Lord President in
Balfour v Smith and Logan, and previously in Youle v Cochrane and Wilson and
McLellan v Sinclair. For example, in The Dalmellington Iron Company v The
Glasgow and South-Western Railway Company,63 decided by the Court of
Session in 1889, the defenders had contravened an earlier agreement with
the pursuers that they would charge them no more than they were charging
the pursuers’ competitors. It was alleged that certain employees of the
pursuers knew that other companies were in fact being charged lower rates,
and that the pursuers had therefore paid the rates in full knowledge of the
overcharge. But according to Lord Rutherfurd Clerk, knowledge that the
full amount was not due was insufficient in itself to bar the claim: in fact, such
knowledge must be ‘present to the mind of the person who made the
payment’.64 On the other hand, he admitted that it might be sufficient if that
knowledge should have been present to the mind of the employee in
question, ‘on the ground that he cannot be allowed to say that he did not
know what he ought to have known’.65 However, he concluded that the
oversight of the employee in question had in fact been ‘excusable’.66 Clearly
the test for excusability applied here was an extremely subjective one, since
undoubtedly the pursuers had within their reach the means of discovering
their mistake, nor had the defenders done anything to induce it.67
Similarly, in Moore’s Executors v McDermid,68 had Lord Chancellor
Brougham’s restrictive excusability requirement been applied the claim
would certainly have failed. Here the pursuers were the executors of a
deceased estate in which the defender had been a creditor. Having paid all
the estate’s creditors in full, the executors discovered that the defender’s debt
had already been discharged some years previously, while the testator was still
alive. In fact, that initial payment had been made by the deceased’s wife, who
was herself one of the executors. Assuming that she had indeed forgotten
making this initial payment, she had certainly had the ‘means of knowledge’;
nor was there any suggestion that the error had been induced by the
62 Balfour v Smith and Logan supra note 47 at 462.
63 (1889) SC 4th series XVI 523.
64 Dalmellington Iron Company supra note 63 at 534.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid at 535.
67 Admittedly, Lord Rutherfurd Clerk also considered it significant that ‘[t]he
defenders knew, or must be held to have known, that they were overcharging the
pursuers. They knew the agreement, and of course they knew the rates which they
were charging to the other traders . . .’. Dalmellington Iron Company supra note 63 at
532. Cf Evans-Jones op cit note 21 at 92.
68 1913 1 SLT 278.
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defender. Thus the defender objected that the pursuers were unable to allege
an excusable mistake.69 Yet having considered Kelly v Solari, cited by
Williams J in Townsend v Crowdy), Lord Shand’s speech in Balfour v Smith and
Logan and the Dalmellington case, Lord Ormidale concluded that the pursuers
had a relevant case: ‘the knowledge of the true position was not present to
their minds in fact or should not necessarily have been present’.70 Again,
although the excusability requirement applied here appears to have had some
substantive content, nevertheless Lord Ormidale’s approach was an
extremely subjective one.71
3.3 Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York v Lothian Regional
Council
It follows that the positive requirement of objectively excusable or
‘unavoidable’ mistake applied in the nineteenth-century cases of Wilson and
McLellan v Sinclair, Youle v Cochrane and Balfour v Smith and Logan has been
comprehensively rejected in Scots law. Indeed, this was made explicit in the
decision of the Court of Session in 1994 in Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of
New York v Lothian Regional Council,72 one of the void swaps cases generated
by the decision of the House of Lords in Hazell v Hammersmith and Fulham
Borough Council73 in 1994. Having abrogated the mistake of law rule, Lord
Hope went on to hold that ‘it is not part of the law of Scotland that the error
must be shown to be excusable’.74 On the other hand, the Court did not go
so far as to reject entirely the idea of a substantive excusability requirement,
as Lord Shand had done in Balfour v Smith and Logan.75 Rather, the
substantive inexcusability of the transferor’s mistake is one of several factors
which the recipient of a transfer might point to in order to show that equity
favoured its retention. ‘Once the pursuer has averred the necessary
ingredients to show that prima facie he is entitled to a remedy, it is for the
defender to raise the issue which may lead to a decision that the remedy
should be refused on grounds of equity.’76 Lord Clyde expressed the matter
in similar terms:
‘Excusability is not an essential ingredient in the principle but may be an
element in the decision to grant a remedy in particular circumstances. While I
would hesitate to lay down any absolute principle on the specific requirements
69 Moore’s Executors supra note 68 at 279.
70 Ibid at 280.
71 The Dalmellington case supra note 63 was again followed in Inverness County
Council v McDonald 1949 SLT (Sh. Ct) 79.
72 Morgan Guaranty Trust supra note 1 at 165–7 (Lord Hope), 173 (Lord Clyde),
175 (Lord Cullen). Cf Evans-Jones op cit note 21 at 93–5.
73 [1992] 2AC 1.
74 Morgan Guaranty Trust supra note 1 at 166.
75 ‘This is not to say that the nature of the error and the question whether it could
have been avoided may not play a part in a decision as to where the equities may lie if
the point is raised in answer to the pursuer’s claim.’ Ibid.
76 Ibid.
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of pleading so far as excusability is concerned, because cases might occur where
the circumstances in which the payment was made might require the pursuer
to explain why it was equitable in such a context that he should be repaid, it
seems to me that almost always the onus will technically lie on the defender.’77
Regarding the issues raised by the defender in this respect, Lord Hope
concluded that ‘I do not find anything in these averments to suggest that the
defenders have any legitimate criticism to make of the error which the
pursuers were under at the time of the transaction, which is admitted to have
been common to both parties.’78 As in Bell v Thompson, whether the mistake
in question had been shared by the defender was considered relevant in
determining the balance of equities.
4. THE REQUIREMENT OF EXCUSABLE MISTAKE IN SOUTH
AFRICAN LAW
As we have seen, the majority of the Roman-Dutch institutional writers
recognized neither the mistake of law rule nor the requirement of excusable
mistake of fact in the context of the condictio indebiti, although Johannes
Voet exceptionally embraced both.79 Rather, as in Scottish law, these
requirements began to be applied consistently to the condictio indebiti only
during the nineteenth century; as in Scottish law, this development was
driven by the courts. However, in South African law there appear to have
been several additional elements at work, elements absent from Scottish law
during the same period. It is these elements in particular that seem to account
for the divergence between modern Scottish and South African law in this
respect, explaining as they do the stringent approach to the requirement of
excusable mistake which prevails in modern South African law.
4.1 Divisional Council of Aliwal North v De Wet and Logan v Beit: The
influence of Chief Justice De Villiers
The decision of Kotzé CJ in Rooth v The State80 in the Supreme Court of
what was then the South African Republic is widely regarded as the origin of
both the mistake of law rule and the requirement of excusable mistake in
South African law.81 The applicants in the Rooth case had paid dues on the
transfer of certain gold claims between August 1887 and August 1888,
payments which it turned out had not been owing. The applicants sought to
recover these payments by means of the condictio indebiti, already well
established in South African law; they relied on their mistaken belief as to
77 Ibid at 173.
78 Ibid at 166. Cf Evans-Jones op cit note 21 at 93–4, who observes that in modern
Scottish law an inexcusable mistake can only be relevant where it was not common to
both parties.
79 See Section 2 above.
80 (1888) 2 SAR 259.
81 In particular, Daniel Visser regards the Rooth case as the origin of the require-
ment of excusable mistake in SouthAfrican law: See eg Visser op cit note 25 at 531–2.
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their liability to make them, which was a mistake of law. Kotzé CJ followed
Cujacius, Donellus, Merenda, Brunneman, Domat, Voet, Glück, Savigny,
Mackeldey, Goudsmit, and Windscheid in concluding that, according to the
correct reading of the Roman law, money paid under mistake of law could
not be reclaimed by means of the condictio.82 As for mistake of fact, here
Kotzé CJ stated simply that ‘the commentators and expounders of the
Roman law are all agreed that money paid in mistake of fact can be
recovered back’.83 Thus he appears to have seen recovery for mistake of fact
as entirely unrestricted. However, later in his judgment the Chief Justice
remarked with respect to the mistake of law rule that ‘the jurists of our own
time . . . are more or less inclined to adopt a middle view and (as Glück
expresses it) discard the distinction between mistake of law and mistake of
fact, and simply consider if the error, whether juris or facti, be excusable
(verzeihlich, entschuldbar) or not’.84 The Chief Justice was clearly alluding
— albeit rather cautiously — to the Pandectists’ idea of an overarching
criterion of excusability, applicable to both mistake of law and mistake of
fact, an idea previously unknown in South African law.85 As we have seen,
according to their analysis, mistakes of law were typically avoidable and
therefore typically inexcusable, while mistakes of fact were typically
excusable.86 In fact, in the Rooth case it made no difference whether this
‘middle view’ was adopted or not, since there was in fact no such ‘special
equity’ on the side of the applicants to justify departing from the
characterization of mistakes of law as typically inexcusable.87 Thus it does not
seem that the Chief Justice meant to introduce into South African law a
positive requirement of excusable mistake of fact, to be demonstrated by the
plaintiff in every case, as Lord Chancellor Brougham had done in Wilson and
McLellan v Sinclair.
However, only a few years later, a positive requirement of excusable
mistake of fact was independently recognized, this time by the Supreme
Court of the Cape Colony, in Divisional Council of Aliwal North v De Wet.88
The Divisional Council of Aliwal North had made a series of payments to De
Wet between 1883 and 1888, relying on a statutory provision according to
which divisional councils were permitted to pay travelling expenses to their
members provided that the member’s ordinary place of residence was more
the fifteen miles away from the place of the meeting. De Wet had repeatedly
82 Thus he rejected what he saw as the view of Van Leeuwen, Huber, Cocceius,
Peckius, Carpzovius, Vinnius, D’Aguesseau, Leyser and Mühlenbruch, that money
paid under mistake of law could be recovered in certain circumstances: Rooth supra
note 80 at 263.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid at 265.
85 He referred explicitly to the Pandectists’ analysis of the Roman sources, citing
works by Thibaut, Savigny, Mackeldey, Goudsmit, Modderman and Windscheid.
86 See Section 2 above.
87 Rooth supra note 80 at 265–7.
88 (1890) 7 SC 232.
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represented to the Aliwal North Divisional Council that he lived sufficiently
far from the meeting place to be entitled to his expenses. In fact, when the
council finally undertook to measure the distance, it turned out to be slightly
shorter than the required fifteen miles. De Villiers CJ accepted the argument
of counsel for the defendant that in order to found the condictio indebiti a
mistake must not only be a mistake of fact but also a iustus error, a phrase
which he translated as ‘excusable mistake’.89 In support of this view he cited
the view of Johannes Voet that in order to found the condictio, a mistake of
fact must not be supina aut affectata (‘negligent or studied’).90 He went on to
approve the view expressed by Voet in his Commentary on D 22.6 (general
analysis of mistake of law and fact) that a mistake would usually be regarded
as negligent and studied if it pertained to the plaintiff’s own affairs.91 That was
certainly the case here: all public roads in the district were under the council’s
control. However, De Villiers CJ immediately introduced the further
qualification, not found anywhere in Voet, that even ignorance of one’s own
affairs might be considered excusable if one had been led into the mistake by
the recipient himself.92 He concluded that the question of the distance from
his house to the meeting place of the council was something the defendant
ought to have known, since he himself travelled it all the time, and that for
this reason the council had been justified in accepting his assurances, that is,
they had not been bound to make further inquiry. Accordingly the council
recovered the money paid out.
In one sense the version of the excusability requirement applied by De
Villiers CJ in the Aliwal North case comes straight from Voet’s Commentary: he
certainly used Voet’s negative formulation, that a mistake must not be supina
aut affectata if it is to found the condictio. On the other hand, his
formulation of the requirement in terms of ‘excusable mistake’ resembled the
approach adopted by Lord Brougham in Wilson and McLellan v Sinclair and
followed in Youle v Cochrane and Balfour v Smith and Logan, according to
which the objective excusability of the transferor’s mistake had to be
positively demonstrated:93 in this case the defendant had misrepresented the
distance in question to the council, it had been reasonable of the council to
accept his assessment, and therefore it was the defendant rather than the
plaintiff who was responsible for the mistake. Thus De Villiers CJ’s
application of the rule in this context had the effect of shifting the burden of
proof from the defendant — to demonstrate that the mistake had been
negligent — to the plaintiff — to demonstrate that it had been excusable.
89 Aliwal North supra note 88 at 234–5. Henry Juta’s arguments for the defendant
are preserved at 233 in the report.
90 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 12.6n7, cited in Aliwal North supra note 88 at
234.
91 Ibid.
92 Aliwal North supra note 88 at 235.
93 See Section 3.1 above: Wilson and McLellan v Sinclair supra note 35; Youle v
Cochrane supra note 44; Balfour v Smith and Logan supra note 47.
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The easiest way to discharge this burden was for the plaintiff council to show
that the defendant had in fact caused its mistake.
In fact, in the decision of the Cape Supreme Court in Logan v Beit,94
delivered by De Villiers CJ the day after his judgment in the Aliwal North
case, he seemed to go further still. Here Beit (plaintiff in the court a quo) had
bought shares from Logan ‘cum rights’, a phrase which he interpreted as
entitling him to certain additional bonus shares which had accrued to Logan
prior to the sale. In the first instance Beit sought specific performance
according to his version of the contract; failing this, he wanted the
‘cancellation’ of the contract on grounds of mistake. De Villiers CJ endorsed
Logan’s reading of the contract, that is, as excluding the bonus shares, but
held that if the plaintiff’s unilateral mistake as to the contract’s terms had been
a iustus error, ‘that is to say, a mistake which is reasonable and justifiable’ in
the circumstances, he could recover his performance under the contract,
subject to counter-restitution, by means of restitutio in integrum.95 Turning
to the facts of the case, De Villiers CJ held that the plaintiff had not been
reasonably justified in supposing that the bonus shares were intended to be
sold under the phrase ‘cum rights’. He could by inquiring have ascertained
that the shares had already been distributed; ‘at all events the defendant was
not responsible for the plaintiff’s ignorance’.96 On the other hand, De Villiers
CJ emphasized that if the defendant had known or had reason to know that
the plaintiff had been mistaken as to the meaning of the phrase but had
deliberately remained silent, ‘relying upon the literal meaning of the terms’,
the plaintiff would have been entitled to restitution of his performance.97 In
other words, he seemed to regard unconscionable conduct on the part of the
defendant — knowledge or inducement of the mistake — as a reason for
restitution in itself.
Thus it appears that in Logan v Beit De Villiers CJ applied a version of the
requirement of excusable mistake rather similar to the one which he had
applied in Aliwal North v De Wet. In both cases the plaintiff was required to
demonstrate positively that his mistake had been an ‘excusable’, ‘justifiable’
or ‘reasonable’ one. In both cases the crucial factor in determining restitution
was whether the recipient of the transfer in question had been responsible for
the transferor’s mistake. De Villiers CJ drew no analytical distinction
between these two restitutionary claims, despite the fact that Logan v Beit
concerned a claim to recover contractual performance — the transferor’s
mistake had both to invalidate the contract and to found restitution of the
performance — whereas the Aliwal North case concerned an extra-
contractual transfer which had not been owing under the relevant statute. In
fact, the only significant difference between the approaches adopted in the
Aliwal North and Logan cases was the procedural mechanism used to effect
94 (1890) 7 SC 197.
95 Logan supra note 94 at 215–16.
96 Ibid at 216.
97 Ibid at 215.
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restitution. Whereas the Aliwal North case was pleaded and decided as an
instance of the condictio indebiti, the Chief Justice saw the restitution of
performance in the Logan case as an instance of the equitable remedy of
restitutio in integrum.98 This remedy is critical to a proper understanding of
De Villiers CJ’s approach to the requirement of excusable mistake. In
particular, it is in restitutio in integrum that we find the origins of the iustus
error concept relied on in both the Aliwal North and Logan cases.
4.2 The influence of restitutio in integrum99
There is no unanimity regarding the nature of restitutio in integrum in
Roman law. Traditionally it has been supposed that it constituted a particular
species of restitutionary remedy: as part of the ius honorarium, it was one of a
range of procedural mechanisms used by the Praetor to mitigate the
harshness of the ius civile.100 More recently, this view has been challenged: it
has been argued that in Roman law the term ‘restitutio in integrum’ may
simply have denoted a generic response.101 But whatever the historical
position in Roman law, among the Roman-Dutch institutional writers
restitutio in integrum does appear to have been regarded as a restitutionary
remedy in its own right, with a number of key characteristics flowing from
its origins in the ius honorarium.102 First, although the procedural distinction
between the ius civile and ius honorarium had long lost its significance,
restitutio in integrum continued to be seen as an equitable action, designed
to provide relief in cases where the application of the ordinary rule would
yield a harsh result. Secondly, unlike a conventional action, in terms of
which relief is available under specific conditions as of right, the restitutio in
integrum of Roman-Dutch law was seen as discretionary. Finally, it was
regarded as belonging to a separate remedial jurisdiction: in the words of
Huber, ‘[restitutio in integrum] is really not an action, but an extraordinary
remedy, by which in default of an ordinary action the Judge is requested to
exercise his duty and power’.103
98 Ibid at 215–17. See also the restitutio in integrum of contractual performance on
grounds of iustus error in Heatlie v Colonial Government (1887) 5 SC 353, Wiggins v
Colonial Government (1899) 16 SC 425 and De Villiers v Parys Town Council OPD
[1910] 55.
99 See further Helen Scott Unjust Enrichment by Transfer in South African Law: Unjust
Factors or Legal Ground? (DPhil thesis, Oxford University, 2005) ch 2.
100 On this traditional view see Reinhard Zimmermann The Law of Obligations:
Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990) 656–7 and 680 ff.
101 Zimmermann op cit note 100 at 656–7, discussing Berthold Kupisch In integrum
restitutio under vindicatio utilis bei Eigentumsübertragungen in klassischen römischen Recht
(1974) 158ff.
102 See especially Grotius Inleiding 3.48; Van Leeuwen Roomsch Hollandsch Recht
4.42; Huber Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 4.37; Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 4.1, as
well as the works cited by Visser in D P Visser ‘Rethinking unjustified enrichment: A
perspective of the competition between contractual and enrichment remedies’ 1992
Acta Juridica 202 at 220–2.
103 Huber Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 4.37.1 [Gane’s translation].
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The characterization of restitutio in integrum as equitable, discretionary
and extraordinary by the Roman-Dutch jurists lent the remedy certain
distinctive features. On the one hand, it was understood to include a wide
range of responses, chief among which was the restitution of money and
goods.104 As for the grounds on which relief might be granted, these too
were treated as potentially unlimited: metus, dolus, minority and absence
received by far the fullest treatment, but several Roman-Dutch writers
included iustus error as a nominate ground in this list,105 following the
opening fragments of D 4.1, the general title on restitutiones in integrum.106
Thus Huber says that ‘the error must be just, not merely free from duplicity
and simulation, but such that the person who says he erred must adduce an
actual, effective cause outside himself, by which he was entangled in error
and a transaction resulting in loss . . .’.107 This combination of features — the
wide range of responses encompassed by restitutio in integrum, as well as the
explicit recognition of justifiable mistake (iustus error) as a named ground of
relief in the sources — meant that restitutio in integrum was extremely apt to
overlap with the condictio indebiti. In fact, none of the Roman-Dutch
writers appears to have conflated these two remedies: they knew their
Roman law too well for that. But even in early South African law, restitutio
in integrum retained a large measure of the vitality which it had enjoyed in
Roman-Dutch law, and accordingly still retained the potential to be applied
in entirely new situations. Thus restitutio in integrum began to compete
with the condictio indebiti, the existing remedy for effecting the recovery of
mistaken transfers.
In White Brothers v Treasurer-General, decided in 1883, the relief sought was
the restitution of duty alleged to have been unlawfully levied by the colonial
government. De Villiers CJ treated the condictio indebiti of the duty on
grounds of mistake and restitutio in integrum of the duty on grounds of
‘justus error’ as essentially identical remedies.108 On the other hand, in
Umhlebi v Estate of Umhlebi and Fina Umhlebi, Judge President Kotzé, the
judge in Rooth v The State, exercised a previously unrecognized equitable
jurisdiction in granting restitutio in integrum in respect of an order of the
Supreme Court which had effected the transfer of land from the plaintiff to
104 For example, Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 4.1n1. See also Huber’s discussion
of responses in Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 4.37.10. On the other hand, certain
other writers appear to have regarded the remedy as an exclusively contractual one:
see Grotius Inleiding 3.48.1 (speaking of obligations generally); Van Leeuwen Roomsch
Hollandsch Recht 4.42.4; Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek 1.18.10. This divergence
is due to the fact that Voet and Huber reflect more closely the position in Roman law.
105 For example, Huber Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 4.37.12; Voet Commentarius
ad Pandectas 4.1n26; Van der Linden Koopmans Handboek 1.18.10.
106 D 4.1.1 (Ulpian Book 11 On the Edict) lists metus, fraud, minority and absence.
To this, D 4.1.2 (Paul Book 1 Opinions) adds change of status and iustus error [trans-
lated by Watson as ‘justifiable mistake’].
107 Huber Heedendaegse Rechtsgeleertheyt 4.41.6 [Gane’s translation].
108 (1883) 2 SC 322, 349.
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her son, thus effectively ordering the restitution of the land itself. The basis
for such intervention was the plaintiff’s mistaken belief at the time of the
order that her marriage was governed by customary rather than civil law, a
mistake held to be a iustus error in the circumstances.109 In granting restitutio
in integrum, both De Villiers CJ and Kotzé JP understood themselves to be
exercising a specifically equitable jurisdiction, relieving the deserving
plaintiff of the consequences of his or her mistake by reversing the transfer
which he or she had made. But while Kotzé JP distinguished between the
causes of action inherent in the condictio indebiti and restitutio in integrum,
as his decisions in the Rooth and Umhlebi cases respectively show, De Villiers
CJ did not. The Chief Justice was encouraged to treat these remedies as
interchangeable by the tradition, originating with the ancient sources, of
emphasizing the ‘equitable’ character of the condictio indebiti.110
Thus it appears that the concept of iustus error was transplanted to the
condictio indebiti directly from restitutio in integrum. Restitutio in
integrum was the immediate source of the iustus error requirement applied
by De Villiers CJ in both Aliwal North v De Wet — in which restitution was
treated as an instance of the condictio indebiti — and Logan v Beit — in
which restitution was treated as an instance of restitutio in integrum. This
borrowing is perhaps unsurprising, since both these remedies could be used
in the ius commune to effect the recovery of money or goods transferred by
mistake. However, to the extent that the condictio indebiti and restitutio in
integrum were regarded by the Chief Justice as essentially similar remedies
— and it is clear from his decision in the White Brothers case in particular that
they were — this was to have a profound effect on the way in which South
African judges understood the condictio indebiti.111
4.3 Consolidation of the requirement of iustus error in the context of the condictio
indebiti
Chief Justice De Villiers’ iustus error requirement quickly became orthodoxy
throughout the British Colonies at the Cape and Natal. In Chaffer v Wade and
109 Umhlebi v Estate of Umhlebi and Fina Umhlebi (1905) 19 EDC 237 at 249. The
plaintiff’s mistake was acknowledged to be a mistake of law. Nevertheless, it was held
to be sufficient to found restitution. Cf Rooth supra note 80. See also Stewart’s Assignee
v Wall’s Trustee (1885) 3 SC 243.
110 According to Pomponius, ‘by the law of nature it is fair that no-one become
richer by the loss and injury of another’: (Pomponius Book 21 On Sabinus, D 12.6.14,
and Book 9 Various Readings, D 50.17.206 [Watson’s translation].) By the ius com-
mune this view was ubiquitous: hence for example the statement of the Roman-
Dutch jurist Vinnius, to the effect that the condictio indebiti is an action granted ‘ex
bono et aequo’: Vinnius Selectae Quaestiones 1.47. See the discussion of this passage in
Rooth supra note 80 at 263. Also Port Elizabeth Divisional Council v Uitenhage Divisional
Council 1868 Buch 221 at 225 (Connor J) and Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925AD
282 at 296 (Kotzé JA).
111 Moreover, it appears that restitutio in integrum — and the concept of iustus
error in particular — acted as a conduit for the importing into South African law of
the doctrine of equitable mistake in the English law of contract. See further Scott op
cit note 99 ch 2.
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Sons,112 decided in 1905, the Supreme Court of Natal stated obiter that
excusable mistake of fact was required to found the condictio indebiti. Bale
CJ held, citing the Aliwal North case, that ‘nor does every error of fact excuse,
but only such errors as a man might fall into, notwithstanding ordinary
care’.113 Similarly, in Peters v Adams, decided in 1907, the court explicitly
followed the Aliwal North case in regarding the inducement of the plaintiff’s
mistake by the defendant as crucial to determining ‘justus error’.114 It was
held, following the reasoning in the Aliwal North case, that while an error
concerning the plaintiff’s own affairs would generally be considered ‘supina
aut affectata’, ‘if the plaintiff has been led into the mistake by the defendant
himself he is entitled to relief . . .’.115
On the other hand, the courts of the South African Republic (after 1902
the Transvaal Province) rejected it out of hand. Like the Scottish courts of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they sought to repudiate
this conception of the excusability requirement in favour of the English
approach typified in Kelly v Solari116 and Townsend v Crowdy.117 In Natal Bank
Ltd v Roorda,118 a decision of the Witwatersrand High Court in 1903, the
plaintiff bank had mistakenly honoured a cheque which had been counter-
manded by the drawer, having failed to pass on his letter to the ledger clerk
on duty. Yet recovery of the money paid out was nevertheless permitted:
having quoted extensively from that portion of the speech of Baron Parke in
Kelly v Solari in which he held that ‘money . . . paid under the impression of
the truth of a fact which is untrue . . . may, generally speaking, be recovered
back, however careless the party paying may have been, in omitting to use
due diligence to inquire into the fact,’119 Smith J simply remarked that ‘the
principles of Roman-Dutch law are similar’.120 Four years later, in Natal
112 NLR 27 (1905) 6 at 75–6.
113 Chaffer supra note 112 at 75.
114 NLR 28 (1907) 429. See also the very similar decision in Bell v Ramsay 1928
NPD 266.
115 Peters supra note 114 at 433. In fact the plaintiff, a clerk at the Government
Savings Bank, had paid out £5 to the defendant in the mistaken belief that there were
sufficient funds in his account; this mistake arose from a previous error on the part of
the plaintiff (he had entered a withdrawal as a credit instead of a debit) and not from
any conduct on the part of the defendant. Thus the plaintiff’s mistake in this respect
was held to be insufficient to found the condictio, although ultimately the case was
decided on another ground.
116 Supra note 61.
117 (1860) 8 CB Rep NS 477. Cf Section 3.2 above: Kelly v Solari and Townsend v
Crowdy were precisely the English cases relied on by Lord Shand in Balfour v Smith and
Logan supra note 47, the decision in which he repudiated Lord Chancellor
Brougham’s approach. See also Dalmellington Iron Company supra note 63 and Moore’s
Executors v McDermid supra note 68.
118 1903 TH 298.
119 Kelly v Solari supra note 61 at 59.
120 Oddly he cited the Aliwal North case as authority for this proposition: Roorda
supra note 118 at 303.
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Bank v Kurunda,121 another member of the same court stated the position
even more strongly, remarking obiter that ‘where an action is brought to
recover money paid under mistake, the question is whether the claimant was
ignorant of the facts, not whether with greater diligence he might have
discovered them . . . though the neglect of means of knowledge may be
important on the question of waiver or acquiescence’.122 The similarities
between the development of the excusability requirement in South African
and Scottish law are striking.123
However, during the course of the twentieth century this conception of
the excusability requirement was comprehensively rejected by the South
African courts in favour of the far more restrictive versions of the
requirement adopted in Divisional Council of Aliwal North v De Wet and Logan
v Beit.124 In Rahim v Minister of Justice,125 decided by the Appellate Division in
1964, the same vehicle had mistakenly been attached twice by a messenger of
the court in respect of two different judgment debts. The Minister sought to
recover the amount paid to the second creditor by means of the condictio
indebiti. Like Kotzé CJ in the Rooth case, Van Blerk JA cited the work of the
eighteenth-century jurist Glück as authority for the proposition that
payment should have been made as the result of an excusable error, in the
sense that it should not have been based on gross ignorance.126 He also
referred to Leyser’s Meditationes, to the effect that gross and inexcusable
mistake bars the condictio indebiti.127 Thus far, he appeared to be embracing
the negative formulation of the excusability requirement found in D 22.6, in
Voet,128 and in the writings of the Pandectists on the condictio indebiti,
according to which mistake of fact was presumed to be excusable and
restitution was precluded only by gross negligence. On turning to the facts of
the case, however, Van Blerk JA denied recovery, emphasizing that
121 1907 TH 155 (Bristowe J).
122 Kurunda supra note 122 at 165. Bristowe J relied specifically on Kelly v Solari and
Townsend v Crowdy in this respect. In fact, this approach was applied as late as 1949 by
the Natal Provincial Division. In Durban Corporation Superannuation Fund v Campbell
1949 (3) SA 1057 (N), the plaintiff sought to recover an overpayment made to the
defendant as executrix of her deceased husband’s estate. De Wet J chose to regard the
claimant’s ‘gross negligence’ as a matter of purely evidentiary significance: ‘I do not
think that one can spell out from the acts of negligence an intention to make a gift of
the excess payment . . . Although negligence contributed toward the mistake being
made, it, nonetheless, was a genuine mistake.’ (At 1066.) See also Vorster v Marine &
Trade Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1968 (1) SA130 (O) 133.
123 See Section 3.2 above.
124 However, in Union Government v National Bank of South Africa 1921 AD 121 the
Appellate Division, while referring specifically to the requirement of iustus error,
appears to have interpreted it rather loosely, in that recovery was permitted despite
the fact that the defendants were in no way responsible for the plaintiffs’ rather careless
mistake:At 126 (Innes CJ) and 140 (Juta JA).
125 1964 (4) SA630 (A).
126 Rahim supra note 125 at 634.
127 Ibid.
128 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas 12.6n7.
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‘[the employee of the Minister] . . . had the means of knowledge and the
opportunity to ascertain the true facts. He was not led into the mistake by
somebody else. . . . He was by no means justified in assuming after a futile
enquiry that the vehicle was the property of Hoosen.’129
Thus it seems that Van Blerk JA in fact treated objectively blameless
mistake as a positive element in the Minister’s claim to recover. In particular,
he appears to have regarded the inducement of the mistake by the recipient
of the transfer as largely determinative of the question of liability. Thus his
approach strongly resembled that of De Villiers CJ in Aliwal North v De Wet.
Since the decision in the Rahim case the inducement of the payer’s factual
error by the recipient has frequently been identified as a key factor in
determining excusable mistake in the context of the condictio indebiti.
Although he decided the case on a different basis, in Vorster v Marine & Trade
Versekeringsmaatskappy, Bpk130 Smit J emphasized the importance of induce-
ment in determining the equities as between the parties:
‘Defendant himself helped to mislead the claimant. It would be a pity if the law
was not to allow an insurance company, which in good faith accepted a claim
against it and paid it, to recover the amount when it finds out that the policy is
no longer operative and defendant had submitted the claim wrongfully.’131
This dictum was referring to with approval in Calder v South African Mutual
Life Assurance Society,132 a case in which the inducement of the plaintiff’s error
by an outsider to the transaction was considered sufficient to found
restitution. On the other hand, in Barclays Bank International Ltd v African
Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd133 McEwan J denied that inducement of the
plaintiff’s mistake was always a necessary condition for success in the
condictio indebiti, permitting restitution despite the absence of such
inducement.134 However, his decision appears to have been based on the fact
that the claimant’s mistake must in fact have been known to the defendant:
‘[I]t was immediately apparent to [the agents of the defendant] that somewhere
along the line someone had made an unintentional mistake . . . [Thus] it
becomes clear that both in law and in equity the defendant was not entitled to
take the benefit of the money merely because there may have been some
negligence in the way in which the matter was handled . . .’.135
129 Rahim supra note 125 at 634–5.
130 1968 (1) SA130 (O) 133.
131 Vorster supra note 130 at 133. See also the discussion of the Vorster case in the
Calder case (see note 132 below) where the English translation of the passage repro-
duced here is given at 289.
132 1972 (4) SA285 (R).
133 1977 (1) SA298 (W).
134 African Diamond Exporters supra note 133 at 307–9.
135 Ibid at 306.
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4.4 Willis Faber Enthoven v Receiver of Revenue
This trend culiminated in 1992, in the decision of the then Appellate
Division in Willis Faber Enthoven v Receiver of Revenue.136 Willis Faber
Enthoven (Pty) Ltd, a company formed when two separate companies
trading as insurance brokers merged, sought to recover certain money paid as
tax by those companies to the Receiver of Revenue in the mistaken belief
that they were obliged by statute to do so. The main obstacle to the claims
was the fact that the mistakes in question has been mistakes of law; thus the
Appellate Division had first to grapple with the question whether the mistake
of law rule established in the Rooth case ought to be abrogated. In this Hefer
JA was influenced by the fact that there was a large body of South African
authority in which the rule that ignorance of the law could not found
restitution had been relaxed on equitable grounds, that is, in the law relating
to the renunciation of rights.137 In particular, he singled out a number of
early twentieth-century decisions, such as that in Umhlebi v Estate of Umhlebi
and Fina Umhlebi,138 in which restitutio in integrum on grounds of iustus
error had been granted despite the fact that the plaintiff’s mistake was one of
law.139
Having concluded that the mistake of law rule should be abrogated, the
question then arose whether the requirement of excusable mistake should be
extended to include mistake of law as well as mistake of fact. Hefer JA
reviewed the authority in which the requirement of an excusable mistake of
fact had been approved,140 particularly the Rahim case, and concluded that all
mistakes should be subjected to the same requirement, ‘so that the
assimilation between the two kinds of error be complete’.141 Indeed, despite
academic criticism of the excusability requirement,142 its retention and
expansion were justified by considerations of equity underlying the
condictio indebiti: ‘the historic nature of the remedy as one granted ex aequo
et bono should be preserved and care should be taken to avoid it being turned
into a tool of injustice to the receiver of money paid indebite’.143 Regarding
the exact meaning of ‘excusable mistake’, ‘all that need be said is that, if the
payer’s conduct is so slack that he does not in the Court’s view deserve the
136 Supra note 2.
137 Willis Faber supra note 2 at 221–3.
138 Supra note 109.
139 For example, Stewart’s Assignee v Wall’s Trustee supra note 109; Ex parte Joannou et
Uxor 1942 TPD 193. Willis Faber supra note 2 at 221–2.
140 Union Government v National Bank of South Africa supra note 124; Rahim v Minis-
ter of Justice supra note 125; Miller v Bellville Municipality 1973 (1) SA 914 (C); Rulten
NO v Herald Industries (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA600 (D)
141 Willis Faber supra note 2 at 224.
142 See generally De Vos op cit note 20 at 184–5; J C van der Walt ‘Die condictio
indebiti as verrykingsaksie’ (1966) 29 THRHR 220 at 226; Visser op cit note 11 at
253–4, 294–8.
143 Willis Faber supra note 2 at 224.
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protection of the law, he should, as a matter of policy, not receive it’.144
More specifically,
‘[m]uch will depend on the relationship between the parties; on the conduct of
the defendant who may or may not have been aware that there was no debitum
and whose conduct may or may not have contributed to the plaintiff’s decision
to pay; and on the plaintiff’s state of mind and the culpability of his ignorance in
making the payment.’145
Finally, Hefer JA emphasized that the burden of proving such an excusable
mistake rested on the plaintiff throughout.146
Applying these principles to the facts, Hefer JA concluded that the
incorrect belief as to its liability to pay the tax had been induced in the mind
of Robert Enthoven’s agent by a circular distributed by the Registrar of
Insurance, this mistaken belief having been later confirmed by a conversation
with the Assistant Registrar of Insurance. It followed that Robert Enthoven’s
mistake had indeed been an excusable one.147 However, concerning the
second company, Willis Faber, here there was no evidence to show that it
was the Registrar’s circular that had induced their mistake, or that Willis
Faber had made inquiries on the point. Thus Willis Faber failed to recover,
despite the admitted plausibility of their mistaken view, and the fact that their
error was shared by many others, including the recipients.148
Thus the approach adopted by Hefer JA in Willis Faber Enthoven v Receiver
of Revenue — the culmination of a line of authority in South African law
starting with the decisions of De Villiers CJ in the last decade of the
nineteenth century — required that excusable mistake be positively
demonstrated in every case: ‘equity’ required that the plaintiff’s mistake be
shown to be a reasonable or justifiable one in order to merit ‘the protection
of the law’. As we have seen, Hefer JA referred — in the context of the
mistake of law rule — to a number of cases in which the remedy of restitutio
in integrum had been applied, either on the basis of iustus error or for some
other reason.149 Although he did not specifically relate these cases to the
excusability question, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that he was
144 Ibid at 224.
145 Ibid at 224.
146 Ibid at 224–5.
147 Ibid at 225.
148 In fact, Van den Heever JA went even further in her minority judgment regard-
ing Robert Enthoven’s claim. She held that in a case like this one, taxpayers were
under a duty to take reasonable steps to establish the true legal position: ‘Mere casual
enquiry will not suffice to excuse ignorance. (Willis Faber supra note 2 at 227). The
fact that Robert Enthoven’s agent had made positive inquiries as to the meaning of
the circular, and that the Assistant Registrar had misrepresented to him the true legal
position, was not sufficient to discharge that duty. In fact, Van den Heever JA
appeared to be swayed by the fact that the Assistant Registrar’s misrepresentation was
subjectively excusable under the circumstances.
149 It had been applied, for example, where the parties to an antenuptial contract
had been mistaken as to its effects: see Ex parte Joannou et Uxor supra note 139; and in
cases involving the exercise of an heir of his right to adiate or repudiate the terms of a
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influenced in this respect by the reasoning employed there. As for the
circumstances in which a mistake would be said to be excusable, as in Aliwal
North v De Wet, Logan v Beit and those twentieth-century cases considered in
the previous section, inducement of the plaintiffs’ mistakes by the Receiver’s
agents seems to have been regarded as a crucial factor in determining
whether the condictio indebiti would lie. But in addition to this consider-
ation, Hefer JA also specifically enumerated as a factor relevant to
excusability whether or not the defendant had been aware of the plaintiff’s
mistake. In this he seemed to be looking towards the version of the iustus
error requirement applied in Logan v Beit in particular: his focus appears to
have been exclusively on the conduct of the defendant. The plaintiff’s state of
mind and the culpability of his ignorance in making the payment was treated
as a third, independent factor, in addition to inducement of the mistake or
knowledge of the mistake on the part of the recipient Thus it seems that
Hefer JA did not view the inducement of the error by the recipient of the
transfer solely as a pointer to the plaintiff’s culpability. Rather, he saw this —
and the question of the recipient’s knowledge of the claimant’s mistake — as
considerations relevant in themselves.
In the fifteen years since it was decided, Willis Faber Enthoven v Receiver of
Revenue has frequently been referred to and applied. For example, in Firstrand
Bank Ltd (formerly First National Bank of SA Ltd) v Absa Bank Ltd, a bank was
denied recovery of an amount paid out in consequence of a complex fraud
on the ground that it was unable to demonstrate that its mistake as to its
liability to make the payment had been excusable.150 Heher J regarded as
particularly decisive the failure of one of the bank’s employees to obtain
confirmation of its indebtedness, having been alerted to the possibility of
fraud by a third party. He concluded that ‘the applicant’s ignorance . . . was
culpable and self-induced. Such excuses as were offered . . . fall a long way
short of persuading me that the Court should come to the applicant’s
assistance.’151
5. ANALYSIS: THREE VERSIONS OF THE REQUIREMENT OF
EXCUSABLE MISTAKE
The conclusions reached so far can be briefly summarized. In both Scottish
and South African law the excusability of the transferor’s mistake is a relevant
consideration in determining liability to restore under the condictio indebiti.
The use of the term ‘excusable’ in both systems suggests that the requirement
is a homogenous one. However, as we have seen, the requirement has in fact
evolved very differently in each of these jurisdictions. It appears from
sections 3 and 4 that there are at least three distinct ways in which the
concept of ‘excusable mistake’ can be understood.
will: see Van Wyk v Van Wyk’s Estate 1943 OPD 117 and Ex parte Estate Van Rensburg
1965 (3) SA251 (C).
150 Supra note 2.
151 Firstrand Bank Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd supra note 2 at 815.
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First, excusability can be understood as a defence — a bar to recovery —
to be raised by the recipient of the transfer in response to the transferor’s
prima face claim. The thinking underlying this version of the excusability
requirement is that while mistaken payments ought prima facie to be given
back, carelessness on the part of the payer in believing himself liable to pay
might disqualify him from succeeding in the condictio indebiti. It follows
that this version of the excusability requirement is closely associated with the
rule precluding restitution on grounds of mistake of law, since it is often
advanced as a justification for the mistake of law rule that such mistakes are
necessarily careless. Moreover, according to this version of the requirement,
whether or not the recipient of the transfer shared the careless mistake seems
to be a relevant consideration in determining liability: if indeed he did, it
seems reasonable that restitution should be permitted; in other words,
carelessness on the part of the recipient offsets carelessness on the part of the
claimant.152 To the extent that the requirement of excusable mistake has
been recognized in Scottish law, it is this version of the requirement which
has emerged as the dominant one during the course of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. It has recently been entrenched in Scottish law through
the decision of the Court of Session in Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of
New York v Lothian Regional Council, in which it was held that careless or
inexcusable mistake is one of the factors to be taken into account in
determining the balance of equities between the parties.153 This is also the
version of the requirement found in the Roman sources themselves;154 in the
work of the Roman-Dutch writer Voet;155 in the writings of the German
Pandectists;156 and in the judgment of Kotzé CJ in Rooth v The State.157
A second, distinct version of the excusability requirement is one in terms
of which the claimant himself must demonstrate that he was not to blame for
the mistake. Although this second version resembles the first, in that both
turn on the culpability of the transferor’s mistake, here the transferor must
positively demonstrate that his conduct was free of negligence, and that
therefore his mistake ought to be excused. This shift in emphasis, from
defence to positive requirement for recovery, seems to owe something to the
influence of restitutio in integrum, at least in South African law. It means that
the requirement of excusability tends to be understood more objectively
here than in the context of the first version. An important factor in this
respect appears to be the lack of a general test for determining the culpability
of mistakes, like the foreseeability test employed in the law of negligence.
The transferor cannot compare his conduct with that of a notional
reasonable person. Given that the transferor has to demonstrate the absence
152 Cf Evans-Jones op cit note 1 at 93–4.
153 Supra note 1 at 166 (Lord Hope), 173 (Lord Clyde), 175 (Lord Cullen).
154 See Section 2 above.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Supra note 80. See Section 4.1 above.
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of negligence, this lack of a stable test tends to militate in favour of an
objective approach to fault. In practice, the transferor will succeed only if he
can show that he was not responsible for his mistake at all: that it was caused
by something beyond his control. The simplest way for the transferor to do
this is to demonstrate that his mistake was induced by a representation made
by the other party to the transaction, or by a third party. This is the approach
which appears to have been introduced into Scottish law by Lord Brougham
in Wilson and McLellan v Sinclair158 and followed in Youle v Cochrane159 and
Balfour v Smith and Logan,160 although as we have seen this version of the
excusability requirement was comprehensively rejected in Scottish law
during the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.161 Moreover, it
appears to have been dominant in the judgment of De Villiers CJ in the Cape
Supreme Court in Aliwal North v De Wet, and in the decision of the South
African Appellate Division in Rahim v Minister of Justice.162 Hefer JA also
enumerated the culpability of the plaintiff’s ignorance as one of the factors to
be addressed by the plaintiff in order to demonstrate excusability in the Willis
Faber Enthoven case.163
As for the third version of the excusability requirement, it resembles the
previous one, in that here too it must be actively demonstrated that the
transferor’s mistake was excusable. But in fact this version of the requirement
seems to go further: according to this approach, the recipient will be
compelled to give up the benefit transferred only if it would be unconscio-
nable for him to retain it. Most frequently, the consideration justifying such
intervention is the fact that the recipient himself induced the transferor’s
error. This is one of the simplest and most direct ways for the transferor to
demonstrate that it would be unconscionable for the recipient to insist on
keeping the money or goods transferred. Thus the second and third versions
of the requirement tend to converge in practice, since each tends to permit
restitution only where the transferor’s mistake has been induced by the
representation of another. However, in the case of the second version, the
payment can be induced by an outsider to the agreement, whereas in the case
of the third, it must be the recipient who induced it. On the other hand,
knowledge of the transferor’s mistake on the part of the recipient is relevant
to the third version only. Where the circumstances are such that relief is
granted, according to this approach the transferor’s mistake is designated an
‘excusable’ or ‘reasonable’mistake. But in truth this term is a misnomer, since
the focus of this approach is on the knowledge and conduct of the recipient.
Although this third version of the excusability requirement is evident in the
158 Supra note 35 at 409.
159 Supra note 44.
160 Supra note 47.
161 See Section 3.2 and 3.3 above.
162 Supra note 125.
163 Willis Faber supra note 2.
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speech of Lord Brougham in Dixons v The Monkland Canal Company,164
decided in 1831, it appears never to have taken root in Scottish law. On the
other hand, it is this third version of the requirement which appears
dominant in modern South African law, due to the influence of the equitable
remedy of restitutio in integrum on the condictio indebiti. It is particularly
evident in the majority judgment of Hefer JA in Willis Faber Enthoven v
Receiver of Revenue. Moreover, while the decision in Calder v SA Mutual Life
Assurance Society165 is compatible only with the second version of the
excusability requirement, since it concerns inducement of the plaintiff’s error
by an outsider to the transaction, the decision in Barclays Bank International
Ltd v African Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd166 can be reconciled only with the
third version of the requirement, since the fact that the recipient of the
transfer knew or must have known of the plaintiff’s mistake appears to have
been regarded as a critical factor in founding restitution in that case.
6. IS ANY OF THESE THREE VERSIONS OF THE
EXCUSABILITY REQUIREMENT DEFENSIBLE?
Finally, the question arises whether any or all of these three versions of the
requirement of excusable mistake is compatible with the principles underly-
ing the condictio indebiti. This in turn raises a more fundamental question:
what precisely are these principles? In fact, both Scotland and South Africa
appear to recognize a ‘mixed approach’ to the condictio indebiti, in terms of
which the transferor must demonstrate not only a mistake as to his liability to
pay but also the absence of that liability. According to Lord Hope in the
Morgan Guaranty case, ‘the essentials of the condictio indebiti are that the sum
which the pursuer paid was not due and that he made the payment in
error’.167 The dominant conception of the condictio indebiti in South
African law is similar,168 although in the Willis Faber case Hefer JA
de-emphasized the mistake element.169 However, it has recently been argued
with respect to both jurisdictions that the mistake element is extraneous, and
that both Scottish and South African law should adopt instead a ‘pure’
absence of legal ground approach, in terms of which liability is triggered
solely by the transfer of an amount not owed, an indebitum, subject to a
164 Supra note 37.
165 Supra note 132.
166 Supra note 133.
167 Morgan Guaranty Trust supra note 1 at 165.
168 See eg the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in ABSA Bank Ltd v
Leech NNO 2001 (4) SA132 (SCA), in which the need to demonstrate mistake as well
as the transfer of an indebitum was strongly stated. South African law also recognizes
other unjust factors such as compulsion in the context of the condictio indebiti: see
De Vos op cit note 20 at 172; Daniel Visser ‘Unjustified enrichment’ in Francois du
Bois et al (eds) Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (2007) 1041 at 1058–64.
169 Willis Faber supra note 2.
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defence of knowledge or voluntariness.170 Thus in addressing the question
posed in this section it is important to consider both analyses of the
condictio. However, even if it is concluded that a particular version of a
requirement is compatible with the principles underlying the condictio
indebiti, a further question arises, namely, whether there is any compelling
argument of policy or equity in favour of its adoption or retention. This
question will be addressed primarily with respect to South African law, since
it is here that the requirement continues to have practical effect.
6.1 The defence of careless mistake
As we have seen, according to the first version of the excusability
requirement, the version which appears to be dominant in Scottish law,
inexcusable mistake on the part of the transferor is regarded as a defence to be
raised by the recipient once a prima facie cause of action has been established.
Although the subjective carelessness of the pursuer’s mistake may defeat
liability if established by the defendant, its absence is not an ingredient in the
pursuer’s claim. It follows that whether the elements of this claim are
correctly analysed as mistake together with the payment of an indebitum, or
whether the transfer of the indebitum is itself enough to found the claim,
subject to a defence of knowledge or voluntariness, this version of the
excusability requirement is compatible with the principles underlying the
condictio indebiti. As a defence, it functions independently of the elements
necessary to constitute a prima facie claim. This point was specifically made
by Lord Hope and Lord Clyde in the Morgan Guaranty case.171 It seems that
this version of the requirement would be equally compatible with the
principles underlying the condictio indebiti in South African law.
Nevertheless, the question arises whether there is any compelling
argument of equity or policy in favour of the retention of this requirement.
Peter Birks argued in the context of English law that the best justification for
the defence of careless mistake was to be found in its role as a mechanism for
protecting the recipient’s reliance: he proposed rationalizing this defence as
an instance of estoppel by representation.172 Clearly the carelessness of the
transferor’s error does not necessarily correspond to the degree of reliance
which the transfer engenders on the part of the recipient.173 Nor is the
representation inherent in the transfer — namely, that the recipient was
entitled to it — normally sufficient in itself to found an estoppel, at least in
170 On the analysis of the condictio indebiti in Scottish and SouthAfrican law see eg
Niall R Whitty & Daniel Visser ‘Unjustified Enrichment’ in Reinhard Zimmermann,
Daniel Visser & Kenneth Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective:
Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 399 at 410–15.
171 Morgan Guaranty Trust supra note 1 at 166 (Lord Hope), 173 (Lord Clyde); also
175 (Lord Cullen)
172 Birks op cit note 32.
173 Ibid at 182–4.
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English law.174 But where the transferor was under a duty of accuracy
because he alone had the means of knowledge by which the mistake could
have been avoided, he ought to be estopped from denying that the recipient
was entitled to the transfer.175 Birks argued that estoppel might also operate
where the transferor, although not under a duty of accuracy, nevertheless
made an implicit collateral representation that he had carefully checked the
relevant facts, in circumstances where there was considerable inequality
between the parties as to the means of knowledge necessary to avoid the
mistake.176 In cases of this kind, where the recipient has suffered prejudice or
detriment as a result of his reliance on the transferor’s representation, the
defence of estoppel will arise.177 As Birks pointed out, the carelessness of the
transferor constitutes the factual background to the defence, although
analytically ‘estoppel and negligence have nothing to do with one
another’.178
South African law recognizes a defence of estoppel by representation
which is essentially similar to that applied in English law: where the
defendant has relied on a (negligent) representation made by the plaintiff to
his detriment, the plaintiff is estopped from denying its truth.179 Although
there is little discussion of estoppel by writers on the law of unjustified
enrichment, estoppel has occasionally been pleaded in South African law in
response to the condictio, both in respect of the representation inherent in
the fact of the transfer in cases where the plaintiff appears to have been under
a duty of accuracy180 and in cases where the transferor has made a collateral
representation as to the recipient’s entitlement to the transfer.181 Thus Birks’s
reinterpretation of the defence of careless mistake as an instance of estoppel
appears to be potentially available in South African law too. However, there
does not seem to be any scope for the operation of the doctrine of estoppel
outside cases where the recipient has consumed the money or goods
transferred, at least in part, since as we have seen, these defences arise only
where the recipient has suffered prejudice or detriment as a result of his
reliance on the transferor’s representation.182 Thus it seems that any role
which the defence of estoppel might play in blocking the restitution of
174 For a recent account of the doctrine of estoppel in English law, see Andrew
Burrows The Law of Restitution 2 ed (2002) 529–32; Graham Virgo The Principles of the
Law of Restitution 2 ed (2006) 675–84.
175 Birks op cit note 32 at 188–90.
176 Ibid at 193–7.
177 Ibid at 181–2; Burrows op cit note 174 at 532–8; Virgo op cit note 174 at
679–81.
178 Birks op cit note 32 at 198.
179 See P J Rabie ‘Estoppel’ in WAJoubert (founding ed) The Law of South Africa vol
9, 2 ed (2005) paras 652–76.
180 Durban Corporation Superannuation Fund v Campbell 1949 (3) SA 1057 (D) 1066–
8. See Section 4.3 above.
181 Absa Bank Ltd v De Klerk 1999 (1) SA861 (W).
182 On the requirement of prejudice in the South African law of estoppel, see
LAWSA op cit note 179 para 663.
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transfers made under careless mistakes is largely obviated by the recognition
of the defences of change of position or loss of enrichment. This is
particularly so if estoppel operates not as a complete defence to the
transferor’s cause of action but rather bars his claim only to the extent that the
recipient has relied on it to his detriment.183 In this respect it is significant
that the defence of change of position was formally recognized in English law
only in Lipkin Gorman (a firm) v Karpnale Ltd,184 almost two decades after
Birks’s views on this question were first published. In modern South African
law, if the recipient has divested himself of the goods or money received in
the belief that he was entitled to it, at least where that belief was reasonable,
he cannot generally be compelled to make restitution in kind.185 It follows
that even if the defence of carelessness could be reinterpreted so that it
functioned as a species of estoppel, the defence of loss of enrichment would
render such a defence largely unnecessary. For example, in Absa Bank Ltd v
De Klerk,186 a case involving an express representation, the defence of
estoppel was refused because the defendant was held to have suffered no
prejudice: he had paid the money received from the plaintiff bank to a third
party to whom he was indebted. Thus the requirement of prejudice was
understood in such a way as to make the overlap between estoppel and loss of
enrichment almost complete.187
In fact, as we have seen, the defence of careless mistake has only very
seldom influenced the outcomes of cases in Scottish law. Moreover, in the
Morgan Guaranty case the inexcusability of the pursuer’s mistake was
specifically characterized as only one of a potentially unlimited range of
factors which might give rise to an equitable defence to the condictio
indebiti in Scottish law.188 Whether such a global equitable defence is
desirable is a question beyond the scope of this treatment. But it is clear at
least that this (re)characterization of the defence by the Court of Session
makes it even more unlikely that careless mistake will be successfully relied
upon as a defence in the future. Moreover, this marginalization of the
defence in Scottish law suggests that it is not adequately supported by
arguments of policy or equity. As Daniel Visser has observed, the law
183 Regarding the position in English law see Avon County Council v Howlett [1983]
1 WLR 605 and Scottish Equitable plc v Derby [2001] 3 All ER 818 (CA), discussed by
Burrows op cit note 174 at 533–8 and Virgo op cit note 174 at 684 and 711–13.
184 [1991] 2AC 548.
185 See African Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd 1978 (3)
SA699 (A); Visser op cit note 168 at 1048–51.
186 Supra note 181.
187 See also Durban Corporation supra note 180 at 1066–68. Here the defendant’s
attempt to argue that the plaintiff was estopped by its negligence from recovery was
rejected by the court on the basis that the defendant had failed to allege that she had
suffered any prejudice.
188 Morgan Guaranty Trust supra note 1 at 166 (Lord Hope), 173 (Lord Clyde); also
175 (Lord Cullen). See further Section 3.3 above.
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recognizes no general policy in favour of the sanctioning of carelessness.189
Equally, the circumstances in which equity requires that the defender be
permitted to retain unjustified enrichment in the absence of a change of
position are extremely limited, if they exist at all.190 Indeed, the demise of
the defence of careless mistake in Scottish law may be directly linked to the
rise of the defence of change of position, particularly after the decision in
Credit Lyonnais v George Stevenson & Co Ltd in 1901.191
6.2 The requirement of blameless mistake
According to the second version of the excusability requirement, blameless
mistake must be demonstrated by the transferor in every case. Absence of
fault on the part of the transferor is treated as one of the elements of the
condictio indebiti, along with mistake. In other words, unlike the previous
one, this version of the excusability requirement assumes that blamelessness is
an essential ingredient in the pursuer’s cause of action. In fact, this version of
the excusability requirement rests on an analogy between mistake as a reason
for restitution and mistake as an excuse for wrongful conduct. It is as if the
transferor has done something wrong — as if he has committed a crime or a
delict — and is now seeking to exonerate himself by reliance on his mistake.
If this analogy is accepted, the requirement of blameless mistake follows
quite naturally. According to Aristotle,192 wrongful conduct which is
performed in a state of ignorance ought not to be punished, since ignorance
excuses the act in question. But where the actor’s ignorance was careless, in
the sense that it was in his power to avoid it, then the actor will nevertheless
be held responsible for his act. Accordingly, following the analogy through to
its conclusion, just as a culpable mistake cannot be relied upon as an excuse
for wrongful conduct, so it cannot substantiate the condictio indebiti. The
transferor is seeking the court’s pardon for the transfer, and where he is at
fault, he forfeits that pardon.
However, it seems that this analogy must be false. Mistake plays an entirely
different role in the context of the restitution of transfers to the one which it
plays in exonerating wrongful acts. Whether the elements of the condictio
indebiti are correctly analysed as mistake together with the payment of an
indebitum (an amount not owed) or whether the transfer of an indebitum is
enough in itself to found this claim subject to a defence of knowledge,
mistake is relevant because it shows that the transfer was involuntary, or at
least not voluntary. According to the ‘mixed’ approach to the condictio
indebiti in particular — the approach which is necessarily implied by this
version of the requirement of excusable mistake — it is this involuntariness
which gives at least part of the reason for restitution.193 To borrow the
189 Visser op cit note 11 at 294.
190 For example, Evans-Jones op cit note 21 at 94.
191 (1901) 9 SLT 93 (OH).
192 Nicomachean Ethics 1110b18–1111a2; 1113b22–1114a3. Cf note 7 above.
193 See Whitty & Visser op cit note 170 at 410–15.
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language of Herbert Hart, mistakes which found the condictio indebiti are
invalidating mistakes, not excusing mistakes.194 It follows that the fact that
the mistake was ‘inexcusable’ — culpable — cannot logically affect the
pursuer’s cause of action in unjust enrichment, as it might do if he were
seeking to rely on his mistake as an excuse for wrongful conduct. Nor can
the concept of ‘probable’ or ‘plausible’ mistake have any role to play here.195
As long as the evidence establishes a genuine mistake on the part of the
plaintiff, that is sufficient to demonstrate the necessary involuntariness on the
part of the plaintiff (or at least it is sufficient to exclude voluntariness). The
requirement of blameless mistake rests on a fundamentally mistaken
conception of the condictio indebiti. It follows from this that to the extent
that this version of the requirement is present in Scottish and South African
law, it cannot be defended. This conclusion is more significant in respect of
South African law than Scottish law, since as we have seen, this version of the
requirement of excusable mistake has been comprehensively rejected by the
Scottish courts, whereas it continues to be applied in modern South African
law.
In fact, like the defence of careless mistake, the requirement of blameless
mistake effectively protects the recipient’s interest in the security of his
receipt. But because this version of the requirement places the burden of
demonstrating excusable mistake on the transferor, the protection which it
affords is significantly more extensive than that provided by the first version
of the requirement: indeed, its effectiveness is amply demonstrated by the
decisions in Rahim v Minister of Justice,196 Firstrand Bank Ltd v Absa Bank Ltd197
and the Willis Faber case. However, this shows that the requirement of
blameless mistake is indefensible as a matter of policy and equity. As we have
seen, the representation as to entitlement inherent in the transfer is not
sufficient to found an estoppel. This suggests that the reliance of the recipient
on the appearance of entitlement created by the transfer does not in itself
deserve specific protection: why should the transferor be held wholly
responsible for informing the recipient of the state of his own affairs? On the
other hand, the purpose of the change of position or loss of enrichment
defence is precisely to ‘reconcile[s] the interest in obtaining restitution of
unjust enrichment with the competing interest in the security of receipts’.198
It follows from this that to the extent that it provides greater protection than
the defence of loss of enrichment, the requirement of blameless mistake
necessarily leads to the over-protection of the recipient’s interest in the
194 H L A Hart Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (1968)
Ch II at 29. See also EAllen Farnsworth Alleviating Mistakes: Reversal and Forgiveness for
Flawed Perceptions (2004) 12-17 and ch 12.
195 Cf the concept of error probabilis employed by Voet and Bähr, and also by Lord
Brougham in Wilson and McLellan v Sinclair supra note 35 at 409: see Section 2n25 and
Section 3.1 above.
196 Supra note 125.
197 Supra note 2.
198 Peter Birks Unjust Enrichment 2 ed (2005) 209.
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security of his receipt. Of course, one might argue that the protection
provided by the loss of enrichment defence is inadequate. However, such
concerns should be addressed through the expansion of the loss of
enrichment defence. In Scottish law, for example, the defender may raise the
defence of change of position in order to defeat the condictio indebiti where
he had reasonable grounds for believing that he was entitled to the transfer
and that he acted upon that belief in such a way as to ‘make repetition
unjust’.199 The English defence of change of position appears to extend well
beyond mere loss of enrichment, to include any circumstances in which the
recipient’s position has so changed that it would be inequitable to order
restitution.200 South Africa could provide greater protection to the recipi-
ent’s interest in the security of his receipt in a rational way by widening the
scope of its loss of enrichment defence. It need not rely in this respect on the
irrational limitation on recovery represented by the requirement of blameless
mistake.
6.3 The requirement of justifiable mistake
Finally, according to the third version of the excusability requirement, the
recipient of the transfer will be compelled to give it up only if there is some
feature of his conduct which would make it unconscionable for him to retain
it: whether he knew of the transferor’s mistake, or induced it himself.
Although there are hints of this version of the requirement of excusable
mistake in Scottish law, it is only in South African law that it has achieved
dominance. The emergence of the requirement of justifiable mistake in
particular appears to be due to the influence of the Roman-Dutch remedy of
restitutio in integrum, via the concept of iustus error. It rests on a conception
of the condictio indebiti as a species of equitable intervention triggered by of
the unconscionable conduct of the recipient. Thus according to this version
of the excusability requirement it is only through the equitable, discretion-
ary, extraordinary intervention of the court that the claimant’s completed
transaction — the mistaken transfer — can be reversed.
In fact, as we have seen, the excusability requirement applied in the
context of the condictio indebiti shares a common origin with the
contractual doctrine of iustus error, which determines the validity of
contracts where one of the parties labours under a unilateral mistake as to
terms: both the contractual and enrichment versions of the iustus error
doctrine have their roots in the Roman-Dutch remedy of restitutio in
integrum.201 Moreover, the concept of iustus error in modern contract
law still carries essentially the same meaning as it did in the decision of De
Villiers CJ in Logan v Beit in 1890, that is, before the two doctrines were
199 See eg Credit Lyonnais v George Stevenson & Co Ltd supra note 191; Royal Bank of
Scotland v Watt 1991 SC 48; Evans-Jones op cit note 21 at 291–303.
200 See eg the formulation adopted by Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman supra note 184.
Also Burrows op cit note 174 at 512–17; Virgo supra note 174 at 691–3.
201 See Sections 4.1 and 4.2 above.
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distinguished.202 It refers to a mistake as to terms on the part of the party
seeking to escape the contract which was either known to the other party at
the time of contracting,203 or ought to have been known to him,204 or which
was in fact induced by him, either through a positive misrepresentation205 or
by remaining silent in circumstances in which there was a duty to speak,
because of a prior misrepresentation206 or where a term in the contract
constitutes a ‘trap for the unwary’.207 As recently held by the Supreme Court
of Appeal in Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd, ‘[t]he law recognises that it
would be unconscionable for a person to enforce the terms of a document
where he misled the signatory, whether intentionally or not’.208 It follows
that iustus error in the modern law of contract still has a meaning very similar
to that of the requirement of justifiable mistake in the context of the modern
condictio indebiti. Again, according to Hefer JA in Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty)
Ltd v Receiver of Revenue, when determining justifiable mistake in the context
of the condictio,
‘[m]uch will depend on the relationship between the parties; on the conduct of
the defendant, who may or may not have been aware that there was no debitum
and whose conduct may or may not have contributed to the plaintiff’s decision
to pay’.209
However, in the modern South African law of contract the requirement
that the claimant’s unilateral mistake be a iustus error has been rationalized
through the doctrine of quasi-mutual assent, in terms of which the primary
source of the contractual obligation, consensus, is supplemented by a
secondary doctrine of reliance.210 In this respect the modern South African
law regarding unilateral mistake is strongly influenced by English common
202 Supra note 94. The canonical statement of the modern doctrine of iustus error in
contract appears in George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) and National and
Overseas Distributors Corporation v Potato Board 1958 (2) SA 473 (A). For recent treat-
ments see eg R H Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5 ed (2006) 314–19;
Dale Hutchison & Francois du Bois ‘Contracts in general’ in Francois du Bois et al
(eds) Wille’s Principles of South African Law (2007) 747–9.
203 For example, Sonap Petroleum (SA) (Pty) Ltd (formerly known as Sonarep (SA) (Pty)
Ltd) v Pappadogianis 1992 (3) SA234 (A).
204 For example, Horty Investments (Pty) Ltd v Interior Acoustics (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA
537 (W); Nasionale Behuisingskommissie v Greyling 1986 (4) SA917 (T).
205 For example, Allen v Sixteen Sterling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (4) SA164 (D).
206 For example, Du Toit v Atkinson’s Motors Bpk 1985 (2) SA 893 (A); Constantia
Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 (4) SA345 (SCA).
207 For example, Brink v Humphries & Jewell (Pty) Ltd 2005 (2) SA 419 (SCA). The
test for what constitutes a misrepresentation by silence is of course an objective one.
208 Supra note 207 para 2 (Cloete JA).
209 Supra note 2.
210 George v Fairmead supra note 202 at 471; Sonap Petroleum supra note 203 at
239–41 See also Christie supra note 202 at 318–19; Hutchison & Du Bois supra note
202 at 748–9.
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law, and in particular by the decision in Smith v Hughes.211 If the other party
knew of the contract denier’s mistake, then it follows that he did not rely on
the appearance of consensus. On the other hand, if he ought to have realized
that the other was mistaken as to the objective terms of the contract, his
reliance, although real, was unreasonable, and therefore does not deserve
protection. Finally, it has been held that where the party seeking to affirm the
contract himself induced the mistake, either by active representation or by
remaining silent when there was a duty to speak out, he cannot claim that his
reliance on the appearance of consensus was reasonable.212
Thus the question arises whether either the original or the rationalized
form of the requirement of justifiable mistake is compatible with the
principles underlying the condictio indebiti in South African law. Taking
first the original form of this requirement, it is immediately clear that the
conception of the condictio indebiti as a form of equitable intervention
based on of the unconscionable conduct of the recipient is entirely alien to
the principled basis of the action. Regardless of whether that basis is the mere
transfer of an indebitum or whether proof of mistake is necessary also, a
priori these elements are sufficient in themselves to give rise to a substantive
cause of action: restitution does not arise by virtue of equitable intervention
only. It follows that, like the second version, the third version of the
requirement of excusable mistake is incapable of being reconciled with the
principles underlying the condictio indebiti in modern South African law.
To regard the restitution of mistaken transfers as a species of equitable
intervention triggered by unconscionable conduct on the part of the
recipient means denying the existence of the law of unjustified enrichment
altogether.
As for the rationalized form of the requirement of justifiable mistake found
in modern contract law, the introduction to the condictio of a secondary
doctrine of reliance, akin to that applied in the law of contract, would mean
departing from the principles which have governed restitution by means of
the condictio indebiti since its origins in classical Roman law: according to
those principles, where restitution is denied, this is because the transferor
failed to make out a claim in unjustified enrichment, not because of the
existence an objectively constituted agreement between the parties that the
recipient was entitled to retain the transfer. Moreover, there does not seem to
211 (1871) LR 6 QB 597. Here it was held by Blackburn J (at 607) that even where
the parties were not subjectively in agreement, a party to an objective contract would
be held to its terms if, ‘whatever a man’s real intention may be, he so conducts himself
that a reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms proposed by
the other party . . .’. This approach was specifically approved by the South African
Appellate Division in Pieters & Co v Salomon 1911 AD 121. For more recent refer-
ences to Smith v Hughes in South African law see again Sonap Petroleum supra note 203
at 239 (Harms AJA); Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd 1994 (1) SA 49 (A) 61 (Botha JA) and
HNR Properties CC v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 2004 (4) SA 471 (SCA) paras 22–23
(Scott JA). See also Christie op cit note 202 at 318–19;
212 George v Fairmead supra note 202 at 471 (Fagan JA).
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be any compelling argument in favour of treating mistaken transfers and the
mistaken expression of contractual intention in the same way, that is, by
denying restitution entirely unless the transferor can positively demonstrate
the absence of reasonable reliance in the contractual sense. Indeed, the very
fact that South African law appears to afford the same level of protection to
an objective contract and an extra-contractual transfer is in itself grounds for
criticism. On the one hand, while a party to a contract makes conscious
representations as to his contractual intention (which representations are
received as such by the other contracting party), in the case of one who
mistakenly pays an indebitum, the representation as to the other party’s
entitlement is inherent in the transfer itself. As we have seen, the reliance of
the recipient of the transfer on that inherent representation does not in itself
appear worthy of specific protection in any form:213 it is certainly less
deserving of protection than the reliance of a contracting party on the
appearance of consensus created by a contractual document or other
objective agreement. More importantly, however, the wider policy argu-
ments in favour of restricting the avoidance of contracts on grounds of
unilateral mistake by means of a secondary doctrine of reliance — the need
to hold contracting parties to the appearance of consensus in the interests of
commercial certainty — are necessarily much weaker in the context of
extra-contractual transfers. Protecting the reasonable expectations of con-
tracting parties is vital to the smooth working of commercial transactions.
But by its very nature the mistaken transfer of an indebitum is a windfall for
the recipient, not something for which he has bargained. Thus it seems
perverse for the law to protect any expectation on the part of the recipient
engendered by that receipt as vigorously as it protects the appearance of
contract. It follows that whether the third version of the excusability
requirement, the requirement of justifiable mistake, is understood in its
original or its rationalized form, this version of the requirement is profoundly
incompatible with the principles underlying the condictio indebiti in South
African law. Nor can there be any justification for supplementing or varying
those principles.
7. CONCLUSION
There are certain striking similarities between the requirement of excusable
mistake in the context of the condictio indebiti adopted by the Appellate
Division of South Africa in Willis Faber Enthoven v Receiver of Revenue214 in
1992 and that adopted by the Scottish Court of Session in Morgan Guaranty
Trust Company of New York v Lothian Regional Council215 in 1994. Both courts
emphasized the flexibility of the excusability requirement, as well as the fact
that excusability was only one of many factors to be considered in
213 See Sections 6.1 and 6.2 above.
214 Supra note 2.
215 Supra note 1.
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determining whether equity required restitution. But these apparent
similarities mask what are really profound differences between the dominant
conceptions of the requirement in each of these two jurisdictions. As we
have seen, Scottish law originally recognized no excusability requirement at
all. However, such a requirement was introduced into Scottish law by Lord
Chancellor Brougham in Wilson and McLellan v Sinclair in 1830,216 in which
he held that the condictio indebiti would be granted only if the transferor’s
mistake could be shown to be unavoidable and therefore blameless.
Excusability in this sense proved to be a highly objective inquiry, and
therefore very restrictive. In practice, it could be demonstrated only by
pointing to some extrinsic cause for the mistake, generally some representa-
tion by the recipient. However, this positive excusability requirement had
been largely repudiated by the Scottish courts well before the end of the
nineteenth century. As a result, in no case since Youle v Cochrane in 1868 has a
Scottish court been prepared to deny restitution on this basis. In the Morgan
Guaranty Trust case it was held that the excusability of the pursuer’s mistake
remains a relevant factor in determining whether the condictio indebiti will
lie.217 However, this is only in the sense that negligence on the part of the
transferor — to be raised by the defender — may act as a bar or ‘equitable
defence’ to restitution.
South African law has developed differently. As in Scottish law, during the
nineteenth century the analysis of mistake of fact found in the Roman
sources was supplanted by a more restrictive approach to the requirement of
excusable mistake, but unlike in Scottish law, this restrictive approach took
root and continues to flourish in the modern law. In South African law this
approach appears to have had its origins at least in part in the ius commune
remedy of restitutio in integrum, of which iustus error is identified as a
ground in the Roman sources. As a result, in modern South African law the
plaintiff in this action is often required to demonstrate that he was not to
blame for the mistake which led him to make the transfer in question, by
pointing to some extrinsic cause for the mistake, such as a representation by
the recipient or by a third party. Indeed, in many cases the focus of the
excusability inquiry has shifted entirely to the conduct and circumstances of
the recipient: the critical question according to this version of the
excusability requirement is whether there was some feature of the
defendant’s conduct — either inducement of the error or knowledge of the
transferor’s mistake at the time at which the transfer was made — which
would make it unconscionable for him to retain the payment.
Thus it appears that rather than a single, homogenous excusability
requirement, there are in fact at least three different versions of the
excusability requirement at work in Scottish and South African law. The
question arises whether any of these three versions of the excusability
216 Supra note 35.
217 Morgan Guaranty Trust supra note 1 at 165–7 (Lord Hope), 173 (Lord Clyde),
175 (Lord Cullen).
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requirement is compatible with the principles underlying the condictio
indebiti, and if so, whether it is supported by any compelling argument of
policy or equity. This question is particularly pressing with respect to South
African law, since it is here that the requirement continues to have practical
effect.
First, inexcusable or careless mistake can be understood as a defence — a
bar to recovery — to be raised by the recipient of the transfer in response to
the transferor’s prima face claim. It is this view which emerged as the
dominant one in modern Scottish law. In this context careless mistake is not
an element of the transferor’s cause of action. Rather, it is only one factor in a
global inquiry into the equities of the case. Because this form of the
requirement functions independently of the elements necessary to constitute
a prima facie claim, it follows that it is compatible with the principles
underlying the condictio, however those are understood. However, the
defence of careless mistake does not appear to fulfil any useful purpose. Peter
Birks argued that it might serve as a mechanism for the protection of the
reliance of the recipient: in particular, he argued that the defence could be
rationalized as a form of estoppel. However, estoppel does not appear to have
any role to play outside cases where the recipient has consumed the money
or goods transferred. Thus any role which the defence of careless mistake
might play as a mechanism for protecting reliance is largely obviated by the
defence of change of position or loss of enrichment in Scottish and South
African law. South African law has nothing to gain by adopting this version
of the requirement.
A second version of the excusability requirement is that in terms of which
the transferor himself must demonstrate that he was not to blame for the
mistake. Although this version of the excusability requirement has not
survived in Scottish law, it has been applied in several important twentieth-
century decisions in South Africa. Although this second version resembles
the first, in that both turn on the culpability of the transferor’s mistake, the
shift in emphasis, from defence to positive requirement for recovery, means
that the requirement of excusability is understood more objectively here
than in the context of the first version. In practice the simplest way for the
transferor to demonstrate that his mistake was blameless is to show that it was
induced by a representation made by the other party to the transaction, or by
a third party. This version of the excusability requirement appears to rest on
an analogy between mistake as an excuse for wrongful conduct and mistake
as a reason for restitution: just as a culpable mistake cannot be relied upon as
an excuse, the analogy goes, so it cannot substantiate the condictio indebiti.
However, it seems that this analogy must be false. Mistakes which found the
condictio indebiti are invalidating mistakes, not excusing mistakes: mistake is
relevant here because it shows that the transfer was involuntary, or at least not
voluntary. It follows that the blamelessness or otherwise of the transferor’s
mistake cannot logically affect his cause of action in unjust enrichment. In
any event, as long as South Africa recognizes a loss of enrichment defence in
respect of the condictio indebiti, it need not protect the recipient’s interest in
the security of his receipt by means of the requirement.
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As for the third version of the excusability requirement, according to this
approach the transferor will be relieved of the consequences of his mistake
only if it would be unconscionable for him to retain it. It is this third version
of the excusability requirement which appears to be dominant in modern
South African law. As in the case of the second version of the requirement,
here the consideration most often relied upon to justify such intervention is
the fact that the recipient himself induced the transferor’s error, but
knowledge of the transferor’s mistake on the part of the recipient at the time
when the transfer was made is also relevant, and it must be the recipient
himself who induced the transferor’s error, not an outsider to the transaction.
It is clear that the conception of the condictio indebiti upon which this
version of the excusability requirement rests — according to which the
condictio is a form of equitable intervention triggered by the recipient’s
unconscionable conduct — is entirely alien to the principled basis of the
action. Moreover, even if this version of the requirement is rationalized as an
expression of a secondary doctrine of reliance, on analogy with the doctrine
of iustus error in the modern South African law of contract, it does not seem
that it can be defended as a matter of principle. Indeed, the parallel treatment
of unilateral mistakes vitiating consensus and mistakes giving rise to the
transfer of money or goods not owed is inherently problematic. In any event,
as long as South African law recognizes a loss of enrichment defence in
respect of the condictio indebiti, it need not protect the recipient’s reliance
by means of the requirements of blameless or justifiable mistake as well. Thus
it appears there can be no justification for retaining either of these versions of
the requirement of excusable mistake in modern South African law. Instead,
the requirement of excusable mistake should be entirely abrogated at the first
opportunity.
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